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OutsourcingThis paper examines the determinants of vertical integration versus outsourcing in export processing, by
exploiting the coexistence of two export processing regimes in China, which designate by law who owns
and controls the imported components. Based on a variant of the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model, we show
theoretically that control over imported components for assembly can affect ﬁrm integration decisions. Our
empirical results show that when Chinese plants control the use of components, the export share of
foreign-owned plants is positively correlated with the intensity of inputs provided by the headquarter (cap-
ital, skill, and R&D). These results are consistent with the property-rights theory of intra-ﬁrm trade. However,
when foreign ﬁrms own and control the components, there is no evidence of a positive relationship between
the intensity of headquarters' inputs and the prevalence of vertical integration. The results are consistent
with our model that considers control over imported components as an alternative to asset ownership to al-
leviate hold-up by export-processing plants.
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Export processing, inwhich a ﬁnal-good producer offshores the ﬁnal
stage of production to an assembly plant in a foreign country, has been
an important part of developing nations' economies. It employed over
63 million people in the developing world,1 and accounted for over
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-ND license. years (Bergin et al., 2009). Recent studies have shown how export pro-
cessing and offshoring in general have important macroeconomic im-
pacts on the host countries.2 In export processing, ﬁnal-good
producers are often confronted with the decisions of whether to out-
source to or integrate with the foreign assembly plant, which in turn af-
fect the macroeconomic effects of offshoring. This paper studies the
prevalence of vertical integration versus outsourcing in export process-
ing using detailed product-level trade data from China's Customs.
We exploit the special regulatory regimes governing processing
trade in China. These legal arrangements designate by law which
party of a global production relationship has control rights over the
imported materials, which are critical for export processing. Speciﬁ-
cally, export processing in China has been governed under two re-
gimes since the early 1980s, which are referred to as pure-assembly
and import-assembly.3 The main difference between the two regimes
lies in the allocation of control rights of the imported inputs. In the2 For instance, Bergin et al. (2009, 2011) link offshoring activities to higher employ-
ment volatility in Mexico; and Sheng and Yang (2011) study how exporting processing
activities contribute to increasing returns to skills in China after its accession to the
WTO.
3 See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for a detailed description of these two trade re-
gimes in China.
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nese assembly plant and retains ownership and control over the impo-
rted inputs throughout the production process. In the import-
assembly regime, a Chinese assembly plant imports components of
its own accord and retains control over their use. Based on a variant
of the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model that incorporates component-
purchase investments, we provide empirical evidence on how control
over imported inputs may serve as an alternative to asset ownership
tomitigate hold-up by foreign suppliers, which in turn shape the orga-
nizational choices of multinational production.4
While there is an extensive theoretical literature on the pattern of
intra-ﬁrm trade, empirical evidence is relatively scant and exclusive-
ly focuses on the developed world.5 This paper thus complements
the existing literature by providing evidence on themake-or-buy de-
cisions in processing trade in a developing country. In particular, our
results empirically examine existing theory on the relationship be-
tween industry characteristics and the relative prevalence of vertical
integration versus outsourcing (Antràs, 2003; Antràs and Helpman,
2004, 2008). Since this literature so far abstracted from the discus-
sion of control rights of imported components, which are particular-
ly important for processing trade in developing countries, we extend
the Antràs-Helpman (2004) model to capture the policy features in
China. In the model, the ﬁnal-good producer in the North invests in
headquarter services (e.g. marketing), while the assembly plant in
the South invests in assembly activities. Who invests in global com-
ponent purchase depends on the trade regime. In particular, the
ﬁnal-good producer invests in component purchases under pure-
assembly, whereas the assembly plant invests in component pur-
chases under import-assembly.
Our model, which features ﬁrm heterogeneity, predicts that ver-
tical integration and outsourcing in both import-assembly and
pure-assembly regimes can coexist in sectors where headquarter in-
vestments are important. In particular, our model predicts that the
most productive ﬁnal-good producers in the North choose to inte-
grate with the assembly plant and own the imported materials
when offshoring assembly tasks to the South, whereas the least pro-
ductive ﬁnal-good producers allocate both the ownership of the
plant's asset and the control rights over importedmaterials to the as-
sembly plant. Based on this ranking of production modes, the model
yields a positive correlation between the export share of integrated
ﬁrms that operate under import-assembly and headquarter intensity
across sectors, consistent with the main prediction by Antràs (2003).
The cross-sector relationship between headquarter intensity and the
prevalence of integration under pure-assembly is ambiguous. The
reason for the ambiguity is that in a headquarter-intensive sector
where safeguarding the headquarter's investment incentives is
important, a foreign client can choose to either own and control
imported inputs or own the plant's assets to alleviate hold-up. The ex-
port volume from integrated plants increases for both import-
assembly and pure-assembly when the headquarter intensity of the
sector rises. If the incremental gain from integration is sufﬁciently
smaller with input control than without, the export volume can4 We take the property-rights approach to study the determinants of vertical inte-
gration. The determinants of multinational ﬁrm boundaries can be analyzed by other
theories of the ﬁrm. Existing research has applied the incentive-systems approach of
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994), and the authority-delegation approach of Aghion
and Tirole (1997) to study the general equilibrium patterns of foreign integration
and outsourcing. For the incentive-systems approach, see Grossman and Helpman
(2004), among others. For the authority-delegation approach, see Marin and Verdier
(2008, 2009) and Puga and Treﬂer (2003), among others.
5 Seminal work includes McLaren (2000), Antràs (2003, 2005), Grossman and
Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008). See Helpman
(2006) for a summary of the theoretical literature, and Hummels et al. (2001) for the
evidence of the tremendous growth of trade in intermediate inputs. More recent stud-
ies include Conconi et al. (2008) and Ornelas and Turner (2009), among others. See
Antràs (2011) for a survey of the literature.increase more for the former than the latter, resulting in a lower share
of integrated plants under pure-assembly in total processing trade.
We investigate empirically the implications of introducing controls
over input purchases on the prevalence of different global production
modes in processing trade. To this end, we use detailed ﬁrm- and
product-level trade data collected by the Customs General Administra-
tion of China for 2005. We ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship
between the share of integrated plants' exports from the import-
assembly regime and various measures of the intensity of headquarter
inputs (i.e., skill, R&D, and physical capital intensities). The results are
robust when we restrict the sample to include only Chinese exports to
the US and to different country groups based on income levels, as well
as when country ﬁxed effects are controlled for. In sum, we ﬁnd evi-
dence supporting our predictions and the property-rights theory of
intra-ﬁrm trade.
However, we ﬁnd no evidence of a positive relationship between
the degree of headquarter intensity and integrated plants' exports
from the pure-assembly regime, where the foreign ﬁrm retains own-
ership and control rights over the imported inputs. These results pro-
vide indirect support to our theoretical prediction that control over
the use of imported components serves as an alternative to asset own-
ership to mitigate hold-up by foreign assembly plants. It is worth not-
ing that this result should not be taken as a rejection of the existing
theory on intra-ﬁrm trade, but rather as a conﬁrmation of its predic-
tions in a more complex setting.
Our paper relates to several strands of studies. First, our work is
most related to and to a large extent inspired by Feenstra and
Hanson (2005), who are the ﬁrst to exploit the special regulatory ar-
rangements for processing trade in China to examine empirically the
prevalence of integration in processing trade. Similar to their work,
we also adopt the property-rights theory of the ﬁrm to rationalize
the determinants of integration. Different from theirs, we adopt the
general-equilibrium framework of Antràs (2003) and Antràs and
Helpman (2004, 2008) that pins down the relationship between in-
dustry characteristics, productivity heterogeneity, and the prevalence
of vertical integration. By solving for the export share of each produc-
tion mode in Chinese export processing, our theoretical predictions
are largely consistent with their partial-equilibrium insights. Feenstra
and Hanson estimate their model structurally, by exploring the varia-
tion in market thickness and court efﬁciency across Chinese regions.6
We instead focus on the sectoral determinants of the prevalence of in-
tegration based on a more reduced-form but more general empirical
model.
Using data from assembly trade in a developing country, our paper
adds to the existing empirical literature on the determinants of arm's-
length trade versus vertical integration in developed countries. Antràs
(2003), Yeaple (2006), Bernard et al. (2008), and Nunn and Treﬂer
(2011) are important precursors in this literature. They examine the
effects of headquarters inputs, productivity dispersion and contract-
ibility of inputs on intra-ﬁrm imports as a share of total imports in
the U.S. Bernard et al. (2008) use a new measure of product contract-
ibility based on the importance of intermediaries in international
trade. Nunn and Treﬂer (2011) explore the varying degree of relation-
ship speciﬁcity of different kinds of physical capital, and use new data
to take into account U.S. intra-ﬁrm imports that are shipped from for-
eign parents of U.S. subsidiaries. Recent studies use ﬁrm-level data to ex-
amine empirically the theory of intra-ﬁrm trade. Defever and Toubal
(2007) and Corcos et al. (2008) provide evidence from France, while
Kohler and Smolka (2009) provide evidence from Spain. These studies6 There is also a literature that studies the spatial determinants of FDI, such as sup-
plier and market access. See, among others, Head and Mayer (2004) for evidence from
Europe and Amiti and Smarzynska Javorcik (2008) for evidence from China. Our anal-
ysis abstracts away from these spatial determinants.
Table 1
Export shares across trade regimes (2005).
Source: Authors' calculations based on Chinese export data from the Customs General Administration of the People's Republic of China.
Total
All ownership types Processing trade Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Billion USD 731.27 416.48 83.90 332.60
Share of total exports 100.00% 56.93% 11.47% 45.48%
Foreign-invested enterprises
BIllion USD 432.91 346.62 43.65 302.97
Share of total exports 100% 80.07% 10.08% 69.98%
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production modes that involve different ownership arrangements.
In these empirical studies, imports within multinationals' bound-
aries are assumed to be shipped from foreign subsidiaries to the
headquarters. However, it has been argued that a signiﬁcant share
of the intra-ﬁrm imports originates from the foreign headquarters
of U.S. subsidiaries, especially from rich countries (Nunn and Treﬂer,
2011). Our paper considers exports from export processing assembly
plants that produce exclusively for sales in countries where the head-
quarters are located. By focusing on exports from the subsidiaries to
the multinational headquarters, we hope to obtain cleaner results to
validate the existing theoretical models, which have so far focused
primarily on the sourcing decisions of the headquarters in the North.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy discusses the back-
ground of export processing in China. Section 3 develops the theoretical
model for our empirical investigation. Section 4 describes the data
for our analysis. Section 5 presents empirical results. The last section
concludes.8 If an import-assembly assembly plant is owned by a foreign investor, the investor
does have residual rights of both the plant's assets and inventory of intermediate in-
puts. What we emphasize here is the control rights over inputs. One may argue that
for foreign-owned ﬁrms under import-assembly, the Chinese Customs may not be able
to enforce the input-purchase decisions made solely by the assembly plant. Article 9 of
“Regulations Concerning Customs Supervision and Control over the Inward Processing
and Assembling Operation (Amended)” (http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/) says the fol-
lowing: “The processing enterprises concerned shall, in the special book accepted by2. Export processing in China
To acquire foreign technology, boost employment, and stimulate eco-
nomic growth, the Chinese government has implemented various poli-
cies to promote exports and foreign direct investment since the early
1980s. One of the key policies is to provide tax incentives to encourage
processing trade, which has been regulated by China's Customs under
two regimes: pure-assembly and import-assembly.7 Since then, export
processing has been a main driver of the impressive export growth in
China. Table 1 shows that export processing accounted for about 57% of
China's total exports in 2005 and over 80% of foreign-invested enter-
prises' exports. Between the two processing regimes, import-assembly
accounted for 45.5% of China's total exports, with pure-assembly contrib-
uting only 11.5%. Table 2 shows the distribution of processing export
volumeacross the four productionmodeswe study. 78%of processing ex-
ports was accounted for by import-assembly, under which the Chinese
assembly plants control the purchase and the use of imported inputs.
Foreign-invested plants accounted for 76% (i.e., 59.71/78.11) of the
import-assembly exports, and for 44% of the pure-assembly exports
(9.67/21.89). In sum, the “split” structure, which involves the foreign in-
vestor owning the plant's assets and the assembly plant controlling (not
necessarily owning) the imported inputs, is the most common produc-
tion mode in Chinese processing trade. This production arrangement is
also emphasized by Feenstra and Hanson (2005).7 Processing ﬁrms import intermediate inputs duty free, as long as the produced out-
put is exported. They are also exempted for value-added taxes. Since imports are duty-
free, ﬁrms have high incentives to apply to operate their production units under.
Therefore, China's Customs is particularly restrictive about the use of imported mate-
rials by the processing plants. Monthly reports need to be delivered to the customs
to show that imported materials are used solely for export processing. Readers are re-
ferred to Naughton (1996) and Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for a more detailed de-
scription of the two regulatory regimes.There are a number of important differences between the two re-
gimes thatmatter for our analysis. Theﬁrst difference is related to the re-
sponsibilities of the Chinese plant. This difference is alsowhat deﬁnes the
regime types. Under pure-assembly, the main role of a Chinese manager
is assembling. A foreign ﬁnal-good producer supplies a Chinese assembly
plant with all intermediate inputs from abroad. The plant simply assem-
bles inputs intoﬁnal products for exports. Under import-assembly, an as-
sembly plant is responsible for purchasing intermediate inputs from
abroad, instead of passively receiving them from the foreign client. An
import-assembly plant is obliged to arrange the shipment and the stor-
age of the imported inputs in bonded warehouses.
The second difference is about the ownership and control over in-
puts and thus the outside options of each party. Under pure-assembly,
the foreign client owns and controls the inputs throughout the produc-
tion process. The Chinese plant may be given temporary control rights,
but will never have ownership of the inputs. Under import-assembly,
the assembly plant controls the imported inputs throughout the pro-
duction process. The imported inputs have to be stored in bondedware-
houses, which are under close and frequent supervision by China's
Customs.8 Upon approval, the plant can use the inputs with other for-
eign clients. In this sense, the import-assembly plant generally has a
higher outside option than a pure-assembly plant.9
The third difference has to dowith the approval standards. Due to the
ﬂexibility of using the importedmaterials formultiple foreign clients, as-
sembly plants would have larger incentives to register as an import-
assembly plant. In practice, it is generally more difﬁcult to obtain a li-
cense to operate under this regime. Moreover, the Chinese authorities
require the import-assembly plants to maintain a certain standard for
both accounting practices and warehouse facilities. For pure-assembly
plants, there is no corresponding requirement. Under both regimes, an
assembly plant needs to show the Chinese authorities the terms of trans-
actions speciﬁed in written contracts every month. As such, the Chinese
government imposes frequent checks on the behavior of the plant and
ensures that it follows the requirements for each regime.10
The assembly plant under either regime can be independent or
foreign-owned. Several remarks about foreign ownership (integration)the Customs, keep detailed records of the disposal of the materials, parts and equip-
ment imported and the ﬁnished products exported under the contract. The Customs
shall, at any time deemed necessary, examine the relevant books and correspondence
as well as bonded warehouses and workshops, and the processing enterprise shall pro-
vide the customs with necessary facilities.”
9 See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) and “Measures on the Administration of the Cus-
toms of the People's Republic of China for Bonded Warehouse Factory Engaged in Pro-
cessing Trade,” Customs General Administration (http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/).
10 See “Regulations Concerning Customs Supervision and Control over the Inward
Processing and Assembling Operation,” Customs General Administration (http://
english.mofcom.gov.cn/).
Table 2
Export shares of the 4 ownership-trade-regime production modes (2005).
Source: Authors' calculations based on Chinese export data from the Customs General
Administration of the People's Republic of China.
Organizational forms
Integration (V) Outsourcing (O)
Input control Pure-assembly (N) 9.67% 12.22% 21.89%
Import-assembly (S) 59.71% 18.40% 78.11%
69.38% 30.62% 100%
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has over 25% foreign equity is considered as foreign. It can be argued
that equity ownership is positively related to control. However, our the-
oretical model does not equate ownership with control. As in Antràs
and Helpman (2004) and Feenstra and Hanson (2005), foreign owner-
ship in our model simply means that the foreign owner has property
rights of the plant's residual proﬁts. Control rights over processing activ-
ities always reside with the assembly plant. Under import-assembly,
the input-purchase decisions are alwaysmade independently by the as-
sembly plant, even for those that are foreign-owned. In the theoretical
model below, we specify formally, using a property-rights model, how
a headquarter ﬁrm can inﬂuence the decisions of its subsidiary.11
3. A theoretical model
3.1. Model setup
To guide our empirical analysis that involves four production modes
(outsourcing versus integration, import-assembly versus pure-assembly),
we develop a heterogeneous-ﬁrm model based on Antràs and Helpman
(2004).We incorporate investment decisions for input purchases, which
are important in processing trade. Similar to Feenstra and Hanson
(2005), we postulate that in export processing, control over imported in-
puts provides “incentivizing” effects similar to asset ownership. We for-
mally analyze the organizational choices of multinational production
involving assembly plants in developing countries, when ownership of
theplants' assets aswell as control over imported inputs are to be chosen
simultaneously by the ﬁnal-good producer. We highlight the key fea-
tures that deliver the main empirical predictions, referring the readers
to the Appendix A and Antràs and Helpman for details.
Our assumptions of preferences, market structure, and ﬁrm het-
erogeneity are similar to Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004).
Consider an environment in which all consumers have the same
constant-elasticity-of-substitution preferences over differentiated
products. A ﬁrm that produces a brand of a differentiated product
faces the following demand function
q ¼ Dp− 11−α; 0bαb1
where p and q stand for price and quantity, respectively; D measures
the demand level for the differentiated products in the ﬁrm's sector;
and α is a parameter that determines the demand elasticity of the
brand.1211 In practice, the plant's input-purchase decisions can be inﬂuenced by the foreign
headquarter in other ways. For instance, the current incomplete-contracting model
can be extended to allow partial contractibility, in which the headquarter ﬁrm can sign
a (employment) contract to specify the level of investment of certain activities.
12 α ¼ σ−1σ , where σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. As in Antràs
and Helpman (2004), the utility function that delivers such a demand function for a
ﬁrm is U ¼ q0 þ 1μ
PJ
j¼1
∫i∈Ωqj ið Þαdi
h iμ
α
; where q0 is consumption of a homogenous good;
j is an index representing a differentiated product; i is an index representing a partic-
ular brand, μ is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between dif-
ferent differentiated products. μ is assumed to be smaller than α, i.e., products are less
substitutable than varieties.In our model, production requires non-cooperative investments
by the ﬁnal-good producer (H) in the North and the assembly plant
(A) in the South. Speciﬁcally, ﬁnal goods are produced with three
inputs: input-purchasing activities m, assembly activities a and head-
quarter services h, according to the following production function:
q ¼ θ m
ηm
 ηm a
ηa
 ηa h
ηh
 !ηh
; ð1Þ
where θ is ﬁrm productivity, 0bηmb1, 0bηab1 and ηh=1−ηm−ηa.13
All η′s are sector-speciﬁc parameters. A higher value of ηk implies a
more intensive use of factor k. In the context of processing trade, a is al-
ways chosen by A in the South, while h is always chosen by H in the
North. Denote by wN the unit cost of investment in h , and by wSbwN
that for investment in a in the South.
Depending on the trade regime under which the joint production
unit operates, either A or H can invest in input purchases. Under pure-
assembly, H invests in both headquarter activities (h) and input pur-
chases (m), while A invests only in assembly activities (a). Under
import-assembly, H invests in h, while A invests in both a and m.
This arrangement has also been analyzed by Feenstra and Hanson
(2005).
For simplicity, we focus on the analysis ofH's decisions between for-
eign outsourcing and foreign vertical integration (i.e., FDI), leaving out
the analysis on the domestic sourcing modes for which we do not
have data. Irrespective of the trade regime, components are always
imported from abroad, reﬂecting what export processing plants do.
A foreign client H can choose to source assembly tasks either
under the pure-assembly regime (N) or under the import-assembly
regime (S); and within each regime, H can choose to outsource (O)
to an assembly plant or integrate (V) with it. In sum, there are alto-
gether four production modes that H can operate her production,
denoted in short-hand notation by NV, NO, SV and SO.
Denote by flk the ﬁxed costs in terms of N's labor units for trade re-
gime l and organization form k, where l∈{S,N} and k∈{V,O}. We as-
sume that the ﬁxed cost for integration is higher than that for
outsourcing within each trade regime (i.e., flV> flO for l=S,N), follow-
ing Antràs and Helpman (2004).14 Furthermore, we assume that
pure-assembly is associated with a higher ﬁxed cost than import-
assembly for both organizational modes (i.e., fNk> fSk for k=O or V).
This implies that pure-assembly entails higher overhead ﬁxed costs
for managing overseas procurement staff and transporting intermedi-
ate inputs to China, compared to import-assembly. However, one can
argue for the opposite ranking based on higher accounting and ware-
house standards required by the Chinese customs for import-
assembly (see Section 2). By assuming fNk> fSk for k=O or V, we es-
sentially assume that the extra overhead costs for pure-assembly
exceed those associated with licensing and maintaining the required
standards for import-assembly. In sum, we have the following rank-
ing of ﬁxed costs f's:15
f NV > f NO > f SV > f SO: ð2Þ13 One can think of a,m and h as quality-adjusted effect units of inputs, with all quan-
tities normalized to 1.
14 How the ﬁxed costs fk′s differ across organization modes k deserves more discus-
sion. On the one hand, more management effort is needed to monitor overseas em-
ployees in an integrated ﬁrm. On the other hand, there may exist economies of scope
over managerial activities under vertical integration. By assuming that fV> f0, Antràs
and Helpman (2004) essentially assume that managerial overload from managing
overseas employees offsets the cost advantage arising from economies of scope of
these activities.
15 We assume that the total ﬁxed costs for each production mode are the sum of var-
ious ﬁxed costs. One can argue that economies of scope can also arise from producing
in an integrated ﬁrm under pure-assembly, and that fNVb fSV and fNVb fNO. For simplicity,
we do not explore these possibilities.
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the division of ex-post surplus from the relationship are determined by
Nash bargaining. Denote by β∈(0,1) the primitive bargaining power of
H, and by (1−β) that of A.
3.1.1. Equilibrium
We solve themodel backwards for the subgame-perfect equilibrium
for a ﬁrm, taking sector-level variables as given. Based on the demand
function above, the revenue of the joint production unit between the
ﬁnal-good producer and the assembly plant is
R m; a; hð Þ ¼ D1−αθα m
ηm
 αηm a
ηa
 αηa h
ηh
 !αηh
: ð3Þ
At the bargaining stage, the outside option of each party depends
on both the organizational form (V or O) as well as the trade regime
(N or S). Different outside options in turn affect the de-facto shares
of the ex-post surplus for each party. We now discuss the resulting
surplus under different production modes.
3.1.1.1. Pure-assembly. In the pure-assembly regime,H retains ownership
and control over the imported components. IfH decides to vertically inte-
grate with assembly plant A (the NVmode),H retains the right to ﬁre the
manager of A and seize her relationship-speciﬁc inputs. If bargaining fails,
H can then use A's inputs to assemble the imported components into ﬁn-
ished products with another plant. However, to the extent that A has ac-
cumulated relationship-speciﬁc assets, she is more efﬁcient than an
outsidemanager.H therefore incurs an efﬁciency loss in productionwith-
outA. Toﬁx ideas,we assume thatH can complete only a fraction δ∈(0,1)
of the original output, implying an outside option (threat point) of δαRbR.
Without loss of generality, A's outside option is normalized to 0. In other
words, A's investments are assumed to be completely speciﬁc to H, as in
Antràs and Helpman (2004).16
In the case of outsourcing, if bargaining fails, H does not own A's as-
sets to complete production. Her outside option is normalized to 0 sym-
metrically. It can be argued that given H's ownership of imported
components in this regime, she can use the components to produce
with another plant.What we have inmind here is that once the compo-
nents are shipped to A, the value of the components drops signiﬁcant-
ly.17 Normalizing H's outside option to 0 is a simplifying assumption.
Our results are robust to an assumption of a positive but sufﬁciently
low outside option for H.18
Denote by βNV H's expected share of the joint surplus under integra-
tion, with (1−βNV) being the expected share for A. Similarly, denote by
βNO H's expected share of the joint surplus under outsourcing. The
above discussion implies the following:
βNV ¼ δα þ β 1−δα
 
> βNO ¼ β:
Denote by wNλN the cost of component purchases, where λN
captures H's efﬁciency in procuring components. Under pure-
assembly, H solves maxm;h βNkR m; a;hð Þ−wNλNm−wNhf g, whereas
A solves maxa 1−βNkð ÞR m; a;hð Þ−wSaf g. For organizational form16 If inputs are only partially speciﬁc to the relationship, A's outside option needs not
be 0. This assumption is to simplify analysis, and the main insight of the paper is inde-
pendent of the assumption of complete speciﬁcity. See Antràs and Helpman (2008) for
an analysis that allows for partial speciﬁcity of investments.
17 One can also argue that outside the relationship with A, H can capitalize the busi-
ness networks or other intangible assets associated with input purchases. Once the in-
puts are shipped to A, H's experience in input-purchasing and business network with
foreign input-suppliers probably do not enhance H's threat point and thus her ex-
post bargaining weight.
18 Speciﬁcally, as long as control over components raises A′s outside option more
than H's, all of our theoretical predictions hold.k∈ {V,O}, solving H's and A's problems simultaneously gives the
proﬁt-maximizing levels a⁎, h⁎ and m⁎ in terms of wS, wN, λ, θ, D,
η's and importantly, βNk. Using the solutions to the problems and
Eq. (3), we can express the joint production unit's proﬁts as
πNk ¼ DΘψNk−wNf Nk; ð4Þ
where Θ≡ θ α1−α , fNk is the ﬁxed cost of production and
ψNk ¼
1−α βNkηm þ βNkηh þ 1−βNkð Þηa
h i
λNð Þη
m
α
wS
1−βNk
 ηa wN
βNk
 ηhþηm 	 α1−α :
ψNk reaches its maximum when
βN η
a  ¼ 1−αηa
 
1−ηa
 
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ηa 1−αηað Þ 1−ηað Þ 1−α 1−ηað Þð Þp
1−2ηa ;
where βN* ′(ηa)b0. Given that ηa=1− (ηh+ηm), βN* ′(ηh+ηm)>0. A
higher headquarter-intensity is associated with a higher optimal
βN* (ηa).
3.1.1.2. Import-assembly. In the import-assembly regime, A invests in
input purchases and business relationships with overseas component
suppliers. If bargaining fails, A can capitalize her intangible assets asso-
ciated with the input procurement activities by working with another
ﬁrm in the North. Similar to Feenstra and Hanson (2005), we assume,
admittedly in an abstract fashion, thatA obtains a share γ∈(0,1) of rev-
enue when bargaining fails, independent of the production unit's own-
ership structure.
Similar to the discussion above, in an integrated ﬁrm, H can seize A's
assets to complete productionwith a third-party plant if bargaining fails.
She then obtains an outside option of δαR. In the case of outsourcing, H
does not own eitherA's assets or components. Her outside option, similar
to outsourcing under pure-assembly, is normalized to 0. However, A can
capitalize her intangible asset associated with input-purchasing experi-
ence, obtaining an outside option of γR. Let us denote by βSV and βSO
H's expected shares of the joint surplus for integration and outsourcing
under import-assembly, respectively. We have19:
βSV ¼ β 1−γð Þ þ 1−βð Þδα > βSO ¼ β 1−γð Þ:
Note thatβNV>βSV>βSO. If we further assume that asset ownership is
sufﬁciently more effective in alleviating hold-up by the assembly plant,
that is, δα(1−β)>γ, we have βSV=β(1−γ)+(1−β)δα>β=βNO.
The input purchasing cost in this regime is wSλS, where λS cap-
tures A's efﬁciency in procuring components. Anticipating ex-post
bargaining, H solves maxh βSkR m; a;hð Þ−wNhf g, whereas A solves
maxa;m 1−βSkð ÞR m; a; hð Þ−wSλSm−wSaf g. For organizational form
k∈ {V,O}, solving H's and A's problems simultaneously gives the
proﬁt-maximizing investment levels a⁎, h⁎ and m⁎ in terms of wS,
wN, λS, λN, θ, D, η's, and βSk. Using these solutions and Eq. (3), we ob-
tain the joint production unit's proﬁts for organization mode k
under import-assembly as
πSk ¼ DΘψSk−wNf Sk; ð5Þ19 Table 3 summarizes the ex-post bargaining weights for each of the four production
modes.
Fig. 1. Co-existence of four production modes in a headquarter-intensive sector.
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ψSk ¼
1−α βSkηh þ 1−βSkð Þ 1−ηh
 h i
λSð Þη
m
α
wS
1−βSk
 1−ηh wN
βSk
 ηh 	 α1−α :
ψSk reaches its maximum when
βS η
h
 
¼
ηh 1−α 1−ηh
  
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ηh 1−ηh
 
1−αηh
 
1−α 1−ηh
  q
2ηh−1
:
Notice that βS* ′(ηh)>0. A higher headquarter-intensity is associat-
ed with a higher optimal βS*(ηh).
3.1.2. Choosing optimal production modes
Conditional on staying in the market, H chooses the production
mode to maximize her objective as follows:
π D;ηa; ηh
 
¼ max
l∈ N;Sf g;k∈ V ;Of g
πlk D;η
a
; ηh
 
:
This also turns out to be the expected proﬁt of the joint production
unit.20 H's choices depend on the slopes of πlk (ψ's) and the ﬁxed costs
flk's for different production modes lk.
Recall that for a given ηm, βN* ′(ηa)b0 and βS* ′(ηa)b0. Thus, βlO is
preferred to βlV within each trade regime l∈{N,S} for sufﬁciently
low ηa. In words, in an assembly-intensive sector (i.e., a sector that
has βl*(ηa)≤βlObβlV for l∈{N,S}), integration would not be chosen
as an optimal production mode.
On the other hand, in a headquarter-intensive sector (i.e., a sector
that has βl*(ηa)≥βlV>βlO for l∈ {N,S}), both integration and out-
sourcing can be the optimal organization modes within each regime.
Fig. 1, which plots ﬁrms' proﬁts on productivity, illustrates our base-
line case when all four production modes coexist in a headquarter-
intensive sector. Firms with productivity term Θ below the cutoff
ΘSO exit, those with Θ∈ [ΘSO,ΘSV) outsource under import-assembly,
those with Θ ∈ [ΘSV,ΘNO) integrate under import-assembly, those
with Θ∈ [ΘNO,ΘNV) outsource under pure-assembly, and ﬁnally
those with Θ≥ΘNV integrate under pure-assembly.
The coexistence of all four production modes implies a speciﬁc
ranking of ψ′lks. Within each trade regime, since integration always
gives more investment incentives to the headquarter, ψlV>ψlO for
l∈{N,S}. Recall that the ranking of ψ′lks ultimately depends on β′Sks
and the input prices: wN, wS, λN, and λS. On the one hand, for a given
organizational mode (k), giving H control over imported inputs
under pure-assembly gives hermore incentives to invest in headquar-
ter activities compared with import-assembly (i.e., ψSkbψNk). On the
other hand, lower wS can make A's procurement of imported inputs
and thus import-assembly more attractive than pure-assembly for H.
For a given component intensity ηm, assuming sufﬁciently low mar-
ginal costs of input purchases in the North relative to the South (see
Appendix A for a formal statement),21 we have the following ranking
of proﬁtability:
ψNV > ψNO > ψSV > ψSO; ð6Þ20 Upon matching up, H pays A an ex-ante transfer. An inelastic supply of A's implies
that H will adjust the transfer to make the latter just indifferent between joining the
production unit and staying out. The payoff of staying-out is associated with a certain
payoff of 0. Under these circumstances, H's ex-ante objective turns out to be exactly the
same as the joint production unit's proﬁts.
21 In Antràs and Helpman (2004), production modes in the North are associated with
highest bargaining weights than those for the South. But then they assume that high
wages in the North would make the South production modes more proﬁtable in terms
of operating proﬁts.which supports the sorting of ﬁrms into different productionmodes il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. Suppose A's marginal cost of input purchasing is suf-
ﬁciently low (e.g., low wS), pure-assembly is dominated by import-
assembly, the ranking of ψ's can become ψSV>ψSO>ψNV>ψNO. Given
the ranking assumption of ﬁxed costs (Eq. (2)), there would be no
plants operating under pure-assembly in equilibrium. Importantly,
our main empirical results do not depend on assumption (6).
3.1.3. Export shares
To derive closed-form expressions for the export shares in each
trade mode, we follow Helpman et al. (2004) and assume a Pareto dis-
tribution of Θ, with cumulative distribution functionG Θð Þ ¼ 1− ΘminΘ
 κ
,
where κ>2 and Θ≥Θmin>0. Since integration is never chosen in an
assembly-intensive sector, the market share of integrated exports is 0.
The productivity cutoffs for each production mode can be obtained by
solving a set of indifference conditions. For instance,Hwithproductivity
parameter ΘSV should be indifferent between the SVmode and the NO
mode, i.e., πSV(ΘNO)=πNO(ΘNO). Solving the set of indifference condi-
tions gives:
ΘSO ¼
Bf SO
ψSO
; ΘSV ¼
B f SV−f SOð Þ
ψSV−ψSO
ΘNO ¼
B f NO−f SVð Þ
ψNO−ψSV
; ΘNV ¼
B f NV−f NOð Þ
ψNV−ψNO
;
where B=wN/D. Our baseline ranking assumptions (2) and (6) guaran-
tee that all these cutoffs are positive.
Under the distribution assumption of Θ, the export value of each
production mode can then be solved as:
XSO ¼ DΓφSO Θ1−κSO −Θ1−κSV
 
; XSV ¼ DΓφSV Θ1−κSV −Θ1−κNO
 
XNO ¼ DΓφNO Θ1−κNO −Θ1−κNV
 
; XNV ¼ DΓφNVΘ1−κNV ;
where Γ≡ κΘ
κ
min
κ−1 and ϕ_lk is the denominator of ψ_lk. Before analyzing
the relationship between ηh and the export share of each production
mode, let us introduce the following lemma that helps us prove the
main results of the paper.
Lemma. For organization mode k,
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ≥0.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Similarly, we can show that
d ln
ψlV
ψlO
 
dηh ≥0 for trade regime l; and since
we assume that asset ownership is more effective in alleviating hold-
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the comparative statics of an increase in ηh on ψ's
and the productivity cutoffs.
402 A.P. Fernandes, H. Tang / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 396–414up compared to input control (i.e., βSV>βNO), we can show that
d ln
ψSV
ψNO
 
dηh ≥0.
The export share of integrated import-assembly processing plants
in total processing exports can be expressed as
sSV ¼
XSV
∑l¼N;S;k¼V ;OXlk
¼ XSO
XSV
þ XNO
XSV
þ XNV
XSV
þ 1
 	−1
; ð7Þ
whereas the export share of integrated pure-assembly plants in total
processing exports is
sNV ¼
XNV
∑l¼N;S;k¼V ;OXlk
¼ XSO
XNV
þ XNO
XNV
þ XSV
XNV
þ 1
 	−1
: ð8Þ
Simple comparative statics show that XSOXSV ,
XNO
XSV
, XSOXNV , and
XNO
XNV
are all de-
creasing in ηh.22 Thus, we know that the export share of foreign-
owned plants (sSV+sNV) is increasing in ηh. This result implies that ei-
ther sSV, sNV, or both need to be increasing in ηh.
The ratio XSVXNV , which appears in both Eqs. (7) and (8) but in a re-
verse manner, plays a key role in determining the relationship be-
tween ηh, sNV, and sSV.23 However, the impact of a higher ηh on XNVXSV is
ambiguous since φNVφSV is increasing in η
h, but ΘNVΘNO is also increasing in
ηh whereas ΘNVΘSV can be increasing or decreasing in η
h.
Fig. 2 depicts how the productivity cutoffs Θlk and the envelope of
ﬁrms' proﬁts (captured by ψlk) move when ηh increases. It shows that
XSV (the area enclosed by the proﬁt envelope, ΘSV, and ΘNO) and XNV
(the area enclosed by the proﬁt envelope, ΘNV, and ΘNO) both expand
when ηh increases. The impact of a higher ηh on ΘNVΘSV and thus the rela-
tion between ηh and sSV and that between ηh and sNV are ambiguous.
Graphically, if the decline of ΘNV is sufﬁciently less than that of ΘSV
(see Appendix A for a formal statement),
d
XSV
XNV
 
dηh can be sufﬁciently
positive so that sSV is increasing in ηh while sNV is decreasing in ηh
(see inequality (13) in the Appendix A).
Intuitively, a sufﬁciently large increase in XSVXNV requires integration to
be associated with a sufﬁciently smaller rise in the production unit's
proﬁtability when imported components are controlled by H (pure-as-
sembly) than by A (import-assembly). As such, the export share of
import-assembly foreign-invested plants over total processing exports
increases in ηh, whereas the share of foreign ﬁrms in the pure-
assembly regime declines.While ourmodel proposes that input control
is less effective than asset ownership in alleviating hold-up by assembly
plants, it does serve as an alternative for that purpose. When the head-
quarter intensity of production increases, a ﬁnal-good producer who
designates an assembly plant to procure components (import-assem-
bly) would be more vulnerable to hold-up than those who at least con-
trol the inputs (pure-assembly). Thus, the gain from integration is
larger for a ﬁnal-good producer who does not have input-control than
one who does. Our results resonate with a key theoretical result in
Feenstra and Hanson (2005), who show that the increase in the returns
to giving the assembly plant control over inputs is largerwhen the plant
does not own assets than when it does. Based on this theoretical result,
the authors rationalize the prevalence of the “split” ownership structure
in China's processing trade, as our Table 2 also shows.22 XSO
XSV
¼ φSOφSV
ΘSV
ΘSO
 κ−1
−1
1− ΘSVΘNO
 κ−1; XNOXSV ¼ φNOφSV 1−
ΘNO
ΘNV
 κ−1
ΘNO
ΘSV
 κ−1
−1
;
XSO
XNV
¼ φSOφNV
ΘNV
ΘSO
 κ−1
1− ΘSOΘSV
 κ−1 	;
XNO
XNV
¼ φNOφNV
ΘNV
ΘNO
 κ−1
−1
 	.
23 XSV
XNV
¼ φSVφNV
ΘNV
ΘSV
 κ−1
− ΘNVΘNO
 κ−1 	
.We will use disaggregated product-level data to examine the fol-
lowing theoretical prediction.
Prediction 1- Headquarter intensity and the prevalence of vertical
integration:
1. The export share of vertically integrated (VI) plants in total export
processing is increasing in the sector's headquarter intensity (ηh).
2. If the incremental gain from integration is sufﬁciently smaller with
input control than without, the export share of VI plants under
import-assembly is increasing in ηh, whereas that under pure-
assembly is decreasing in ηh.
Notice that if we examine the fractions of different types of plants
in total number of processing plants (Nlk/N) like in Antràs and
Helpman (2004), the fractions of NV and SV are both increasing in
ηh. Speciﬁcally, NSO=N ¼ 1− ΘSOΘSV
 κ
; NSV=N ¼ ΘSOΘSV
 κ
1− ΘSVΘNO
 κh i
;
NNO=N ¼ ΘSOΘNO
 κ
− ΘSOΘNV
 κ
; NNV=N ¼ ΘNOΘNV
 κ
. Given data on export vol-
ume, we use export shares, instead of fractions of exporters in each pro-
ductionmode, as the dependent variable to examine Prediction 1 below.
Our model also predicts that in a headquarter-intensive sector,
ﬁrms under pure-assembly are more productive than those under
import-assembly. Moreover, only the most productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to engage in vertical integration under pure-assembly. Spe-
ciﬁcally, our model predicts that when the distribution of ﬁrm pro-
ductivity becomes more dispersed (i.e., more clustered on the right
tail), the export share of integrated plants in the pure-assembly re-
gime should increase. However, the relationship is ambiguous in the
import-assembly regime. We will also examine the following predic-
tion (see Appendix A for the proof).
Prediction 2- Productivity dispersion and the prevalence of vertical
integration:
In a headquarter-intensive sector, a higher ﬁrm productivity dis-
persion is associated with a larger export share of the foreign ﬁrms
that operate under the pure-assembly regime. The relationship is am-
biguous under the import-assembly regime, and is absent in an
assembly-intensive sector.
4. Data
To examine the determinants of vertical integration in different
trade regimes in China, we use trade data from the Customs General
Administration of the People's Republic of China for 2005.24 The
data report values in US dollars for imports and exports of over
7000 products in the HS 6-digit classiﬁcation,25 from and to over
200 destinations around the world, by type of enterprise (out of 9
types, e.g. state owned, foreign invested, Sino-foreign joint venture),24 We purchased these data from Mr. George Shen from China Customs Statistics In-
formation Center, Economic Information Agency, Hong Kong.
25 Example of a product: 611241—Women's or girls’ swimwear of synthetic ﬁbres,
knitted or crocheted.
Table 3
Export bargaining shares of revenue of the 4 ownership-regime production modes.
βlk Organizational forms (k)
Integration (V) Outsourcing (O)
Input control (l) Pure-assembly (N) δα+β(1−δα) β
Import-assembly (S) δα+β(1−γ−δα) β(1−γ)
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rted to (out of around 700 locations), customs regime (out of 18 re-
gimes, e.g. “Processing and Assembling” and “Processing with
Imported Materials”).26 In this paper we use data for processing
trade which is classiﬁed according to the special customs regimes
“Processing and Assembling” (pure-assembly) and “Processing with
Imported Materials” (import-assembly). Regular trade is classiﬁed
by China Customs Statistics according to the regime “Ordinary Trade”.
We use two dependent variables. The ﬁrst one is the share of pro-
cessing exports from foreign-owned assembly plants over total pro-
cessing exports at the HS 6-digit product level (or product-country
level). The second one is the share of processing exports from
foreign-owned assembly plants in each trade regime l=N, S (pure-
assembly or import-assembly, respectively) separately over total pro-
cessing exports at the HS 6-digit product level (or product-country
level). The Chinese government considers two types of foreign-
invested enterprises, fully foreign-owned enterprises and Sino-
foreign equity joint ventures. We consider both of these types of
enterprises as “foreign owned”.27 Results remain robust when we
consider only fully foreign-owned enterprises.
Our key independent variables are various measures of headquar-
ter intensity. Following the existing empirical literature on the deter-
minants of intra-ﬁrm trade, such as Antràs (2003), Yeaple (2006),
Bernard et al. (2008) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2008, 2011), we use
skill and physical capital intensities as our proxies for the importance
of headquarter services in production. The measures of industry fac-
tor intensity are constructed using data from Bartelsman and Gray
(1996), averaged across the period 2001–2005.28 For each 4-digit
SIC industry we construct the measure of skill-intensity, ln(Hj/Lj), as
the log of non-production worker wages divided by total worker
wages. Physical capital intensity (total capital, ln(Kj/Lj), and the
break down into capital-equipment intensity, ln(Ej/Lj), and capital-
plant intensity, ln(Pj/Lj)) are measured as the natural log of the
corresponding capital expenditures divided by total wages.
We also include R&D intensity as an additional proxy for
headquarter's inputs.Wemeasure R&D intensity, ln(RDj/Qj), by the nat-
ural log of global R&D expenditures divided by ﬁrm sales in each indus-
try. The data are from the Orbis database, constructed by Bureau van
Dijk Electronic Publishing, for the most recent year for which ﬁrm
level data on R&D are available (either 2006 or 2007). A total of
370,691 plants reported positive R&D expenditure. Since we are inter-
ested in studying the decisions of integration by multinational ﬁrms in
the two trade regimes under which the control rights of components
are allocated to different parties, we use material intensity as a proxy
for the importance of components in production. Material intensity,
ln(Mj/Lj), is the log of the cost of materials divided by total wages.26 The data also report quantity, quantity units, customs ofﬁces (ports) where the
transaction was processed (97 in total), and transportation modes.
27 According to the Chinese law a ﬁrm is considered foreign owned if a foreign part-
ner has no less than 25% of ownership stake. In the U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S im-
ports are classiﬁed as “related-party” if either ﬁrm owns, controls or holds voting
power equivalent to 6% of the shares or voting stock of the other organization. Existing
studies that have used U.S. Census Bureau data to investigate the determinants of intra-
ﬁrm trade use “related-party” imports to measure intra-ﬁrm trade.
28 We are grateful to Randy Becker from the U.S. Bureau of the Census for providing
us with an updated version of the database.We use U.S. factor intensities of production, assuming that they
are correlated with the corresponding factor intensities in other
countries, following existing literature. To check the robustness of
our results, we also construct measures of physical capital, skill, and
R&D and advertisement intensity using plant-level data from the Chi-
nese National Bureau of Statistics' Census of Industrial Firms for 2005.
Restricted by data availability, the deﬁnitions of these factor intensity
measures are different from the US-based benchmark measures. Cap-
ital intensity is deﬁned as the log ratio of the real value of capital to
the real value of output in each sector. Human capital is the log of
the share of high-school graduates in the workforce of each sector.29
R&D intensity is the log average ratio of R&D expenditure to value-
added across ﬁrms in each sector. Advertisement intensity is mea-
sured by the log average ratio of advertisement expenditure to
value-added across ﬁrms in each sector.
We follow Helpman et al. (2004) and construct the measure of
productivity dispersion using the standard deviation of ﬁrm sales
across all ﬁrms within an industry. The data are from China's
Manufacturing Survey for 2005. For robustness we use two alterna-
tive measures based on exports. The ﬁrst one is the standard devia-
tion of export revenue across Chinese export processing plants in
each sector, using ﬁrm-level exports data for 2005 from China's Cus-
toms. The second one is the measure of industry productivity disper-
sion from Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) for 2005.30 We use the US
productivity dispersion measure, assuming that decisions on the or-
ganizational form of the production unit are usually made by head-
quarters in developed countries. We believe that the US-based
measure is a good proxy for productivity dispersion in other devel-
oped countries.
5. Empirical analysis
In this section we investigate whether control over the compo-
nents for assembly affects the decision to integrate with the assembly
plant in vertical production relationships. Namely, we examine the
hypotheses emphasized in prediction 1 that (1) the export share of
vertically integrated (VI) export processing plants is increasing in
the sector's headquarter intensity and that (2) the export share of
VI plants under import-assembly is increasing in headquarter intensi-
ty of inputs, whereas that under pure-assembly is decreasing in head-
quarter intensity. We then investigate whether a higher sectoral
productivity dispersion is associated with a larger export share from
integrated plants in pure-assembly, as postulated in prediction 2.
5.1. Examining the effects of headquarter intensity
To investigate the effect of headquarter-intensity of inputs on the
prevalence of vertically integrated exports, we start by examining the
ﬁrst hypothesis from prediction 1. We estimate the following cross-
industry regression both at the HS 6-digit product level and at the
HS 6-digit level to each importing country to exploit both product
and country dimensions of the data:
XNV þ XSV
∑l¼N;S;k¼V ;OXlk
 !
pjc
¼ dc þ γhhj þ γkkj þ γmmj þ pjc; ð9Þ29 Our results are robust to using the share of college graduates in each sector's work-
force to measure skill intensity.
30 Given the lack of ﬁrm-level data, Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) construct sales of
“notional” ﬁrms using U.S. export data from the U.S. Department of Commerce. They
deﬁne an industry as an HS6 product and the sales of a notional ﬁrm as the exports
of an HS10 good exported from U.S. location l to destination country c. Their measure
of productivity dispersion within an industry is the standard deviation of the log of ex-
ports of a good from location l to country c. We are grateful to Nathan Nunn for sending
us the data.
Table 4
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants.
HS6-country HS6
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.253⁎⁎⁎ 0.073⁎⁎ 0.081⁎
(3.471) (3.032) (2.148) (1.956)
Capital intensity, ln(K/L) 0.088⁎⁎⁎ 0.064⁎⁎ 0.168⁎⁎⁎ 0.134⁎⁎⁎ 0.073⁎ 0.070⁎ 0.057⁎⁎ 0.056⁎⁎
(3.380) (2.341) (4.101) (3.084) (1.959) (1.760) (2.371) (2.055)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.071⁎⁎⁎ 0.048⁎⁎ 0.039 0.012
(2.613) (2.469) (1.241) (1.150)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.101⁎⁎⁎ −0.205⁎⁎⁎ −0.208⁎⁎⁎ −0.115⁎⁎⁎ −0.127⁎⁎⁎ −0.074⁎⁎⁎ −0.082⁎⁎⁎
(−3.474) (−3.377) (−4.028) (−4.033) (−2.984) (−3.336) (−2.756) (−3.034)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
N 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .035 .031 .017 .016 .016 .013 .0085 .0071
N left-censored 14,899 14,358 319 314
N right-censored 33,454 32,285 570 560
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' Export Processing exports as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each
country in columns (1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product category in columns (5) to (8). Standardized beta coefﬁcients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎ pb0.10.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
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represent vertical integration and outsourcing, respectively; and N
and S represent pure-assembly and import-assembly, respectively.
The dependent variable is the share of processing exports from
foreign-owned assembly plants over total processing exports at the
product-country level (or at the product level) in industry j. To
proxy for headquarter intensity, we use the measures of skill intensity
hj≡ ln(Hj/Lj) and physical capital intensity kj≡ ln(Kj/Lj) described in
the previous section.31 In some speciﬁcations, we use R&D intensity
rdj≡ ln(RDj/Qj) as an alternative measure.32
For robustness checks, we follow Nunn and Treﬂer (2011) and in-
clude capital-equipment ej≡ ln(Ej/Lj) and capital-plant pj≡ ln(Pj/Lj) in
alternative to the overall measure of physical capital intensity. The
former type of capital expenditures is more likely to be more
relationship-speciﬁc than the latter, and therefore more relevant for
the integration decision. We use material intensity mj≡ ln(Mj/Lj) as a
proxy for the importance of components in production. We include
country ﬁxed effects dc when observations are at the HS6-country
level.33 The error term pjc is assumed to be uncorrelated with the re-
gressors. Because our regressors of interest vary across SIC 4-digit in-
dustries, the standard errors are always clustered at the SIC 4-digit
level to take into account the correlation between observations with-
in the same SIC category.34
We investigate the hypothesis that exports from vertically inte-
grated plants account for a larger share of processing exports in
more headquarter-intensive sectors. Thus, the predicted signs of γh
and γk are positive. Table 4 reports results from estimating (9). In col-
umns (1) through (4) an observation is a HS6 product to each coun-
try. These speciﬁcations therefore take into account importing
country characteristics such as distance from China, quality of judicial
institutions and factor endowments. Since our focus is on the sectoral
determinants of the export share of integrated plants, we control for31 We also use total employment of each sector as the denominator of each measure
of factory intensity instead of total worker wages. Our results are insensitive to the use
of these alternative measures.
32 Although conceptually R&D intensity is potentially a better measure, there are is-
sues related with data availability and quality and therefore we use it for robustness
checks.
33 When the analysis is performed at the HS6 product level the subscript c would be
omitted from Eq. (9) and instead of country ﬁxed-effects we include a constant term.
34 The mapping of HS 6-digit categories to SIC 4-digit industries is discussed in detail
in the Appendix.country ﬁxed effects to partial out the effects of countries'
characteristics.
The results conform closely to the theoretical prediction for all the
alternative measures of headquarter intensity of inputs (skill intensi-
ty, physical capital intensity, and R&D intensity). They are evidence of
a strong, positive, and statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the
share of vertical integration and the intensity of headquarter inputs
across sectors. The ﬁrst two columns report OLS results and show
standardized beta coefﬁcients, while columns (3) and (4) report
Tobit results.35 The coefﬁcients on skill and capital intensity are pos-
itive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. These results conﬁrm
the main ﬁndings by Yeaple (2006), Bernard et al. (2008), Nunn and
Treﬂer (2008, 2011), who ﬁnd a positive relationship between skill
and capital intensity and the share of intra-ﬁrm trade across U.S.
manufacturing industries. The size of the coefﬁcients is at the same
magnitude of those reported by Nunn and Treﬂer (2008) for the
U.S. We also ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the
share of vertical integrated exports and the sector's R&D intensity
(columns (2) and (4)).36
As discussed in Antràs (2011) and Nunn and Treﬂer (2011), stan-
dard measures of physical capital include certain types of investments
that are easily contractible and thus are not relationship-speciﬁc.
According to the property-rights theory of the ﬁrm, it is then
expected that investments in specialized equipment are more
relationship-speciﬁc, and thus more relevant for the decision of
whether to integrate, while structures or plants can be used to pro-
duce other goods and are therefore associated with a higher outside
value.
To investigate these issues, in alternative speciﬁcations we include
capital-equipment and capital-plant intensity separately in the re-
gressions. We report results for these speciﬁcations in Appendix A,
Table A4. The coefﬁcients on skill and R&D intensity remain positive
and highly signiﬁcant. Capital-equipment is also positively and signif-
icantly correlated with the share of vertically integrated processing
exports. Whereas the coefﬁcients on the intensity of capital-plant
are negative and statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the35 Since the vertical integrated export share dependent variables are limited between
values of 0 and 1, we also report results from Tobit methods. Results are consistent
with the OLS ones.
36 R&D intensity and skill intensity are highly correlated and therefore are not includ-
ed as regressors simultaneously.
Table 5
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (HS6 level).
Trade regime Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.082⁎⁎⁎ 0.107⁎⁎⁎ −0.022 −0.011
(2.621) (2.702) (−0.542) (−0.230)
Capital intensity, ln(K/L) 0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.108⁎⁎ 0.095⁎⁎⁎ 0.072⁎⁎ −0.136⁎⁎ −0.072 −0.109⁎⁎⁎ −0.072⁎⁎
(2.836) (2.014) (2.796) (1.961) (−1.970) (−1.043) (−3.165) (−2.033)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎⁎
(3.293) (3.106) (−3.500) (−3.652)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.115⁎⁎⁎ −0.099⁎⁎ −0.074⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎ 0.009 −0.039 −0.020 −0.050⁎
(−2.693) (−2.387) (−2.474) (−2.178) (0.205) (−0.857) (−0.734) (−1.829)
N 3664 3541 3664 3541 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .023 .026 .013 .014 .017 .029 .049 .059
N left-censored 416 408 1646 1623
N right-censored 412 405 46 45
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category. Standard-
ized beta coefﬁcients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎ pb0.10.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
37 Results are robust to including capital-equipment and capital-plant instead of the
overall measure of physical capital. We obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant co-
efﬁcient on the intensity of equipment, the more relationship-speciﬁc type of capital,
and a negative and statistically signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on plant intensity, the type of
capital that is less relationship-speciﬁc (see Table A5 in the Appendix).
405A.P. Fernandes, H. Tang / Journal of Development Economics 99 (2012) 396–414ﬁndings by Antràs (2011), Antràs and Chor (2011), and Nunn and
Treﬂer (2011).
Columns (5) through (8) of Table 4 report results at the HS 6-digit
product level. Skill and capital intensities remain positively and sig-
niﬁcantly correlated with the share of vertically integrated processing
exports across sectors. The coefﬁcients on R&D intensity remain pos-
itive but they are not signiﬁcant. However, when we take into ac-
count the different degree of relationship speciﬁcity of different
types of capital, the coefﬁcients on R&D remain positive and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant (see Table A4 in the Appendix A).
We now turn to the analysis of the relationship between
headquarter-intensity of inputs and the prevalence of vertically inte-
grated exports in each regime of export processing. We investigate
the second hypothesis emphasized in Prediction 1 that the export
share of integrated plants under import-assembly is increasing in
headquarter intensity, whereas that under pure-assembly is decreas-
ing. We estimate the following cross-industry regression at both
HS6 and HS6-country levels of observation:
XlV
∑l¼N;S;k¼V ;OXlk
 !
pjc
¼ dc þ γhhj þ γkkj þ γmmj þ pjc; ð10Þ
l is the trade regime type that can be S (import-assembly) or N (pure-
assembly). The dependent variable is the share of integrated assem-
bly plants' exports of a HS6-digit product or HS6-country pair in in-
dustry j under trade regime l over total processing exports. All other
variables are as deﬁned before. According to Prediction 1, the
expected signs of γh and γk are positive for import assembly and neg-
ative for pure assembly.
Table 5 reports results from estimating Eq. (10) for both trade re-
gimes at the HS6 level. In columns (1) through (4) we report results
for the import-assembly regime. The results conﬁrm the theoretical
prediction for all proxies of headquarter intensity (skill, physical cap-
ital and R&D). They show that when the assembly plants retain con-
trol over the component choice, the export share of vertically
integrated plants is positively correlated with headquarter intensity
of inputs across sectors. The coefﬁcients on skill intensity and R&D
intensity are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Sim-
ilarly, we obtain a positive and statistically signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween capital intensity and the share of vertical integration.
Material intensity is found to be negatively correlated with the in-
tegrated plants' export share in the import-assembly regime. Insightsfrom the property-rights approach can help us explain the relation-
ship. Under import-assembly, the control rights over the input deci-
sion are allocated to the assembly plant. Since integration effectively
grants a bigger share of expected revenue to the headquarter, it
weakens the plant's incentive to invest in input-purchase activities.
The distortion effects are bigger in more material-intensive sectors,
making integration a less preferred organization mode.
The results for pure-assembly are reported in columns (5) to (8).
We ﬁnd no evidence of a positive correlation between the measures
of headquarter intensity of inputs and the share of integrated plants'
exports for this regime. The coefﬁcients on the headquarter intensity
measures are generally negative and statistically signiﬁcant (with the
exception of skill intensity which is negative but insigniﬁcant). In
sum, the results reported in Table 5 are consistent with the predic-
tions of the theoretical model as skill, R&D and physical capital are
all positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the share of exports
from vertically integrated plants in the import-assembly regime.
The negative relationship for the pure-assembly regime arises be-
cause when the gains from integration are smaller for the headquar-
ter ﬁrm without input controls (import-assembly) than with it (pure-
assembly), the volume of exports from import-assembly expand
more than that from pure-assembly, causing a decline in the share
of exports in the pure-assembly regime in total processing exports.
Since we have used export shares of a product aggregated across
importing countries, the above results do not take into account
importing country characteristics. Thus, we also perform the analysis
using unilateral export value in a HS 6-digit product category to each
importing country as the unit of observation. Table 6 reports results
which are consistent with those reported in Table 5. In particular,
for the import-assembly regime (columns (1) to (4)), we continue
to ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship (at the 1%
level) between the share of integrated plants' exports and all mea-
sures of intensity of headquarter inputs (skill, R&D and capital).37
For pure-assembly (columns (5) to (8)), we continue to ﬁnd evidence
of a negative correlation between headquarter intensity of inputs and
vertical integration.
Table 6
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (HS6-country level).
Trade regime Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.101⁎⁎⁎ 0.292⁎⁎⁎ −0.020 0.053⁎⁎⁎
(3.819) (3.662) (−0.718) (2.620)
Capital intensity, ln(K/L) 0.149⁎⁎⁎ 0.100⁎⁎⁎ 0.238⁎⁎⁎ 0.166⁎⁎⁎ −0.128⁎⁎⁎ −0.078 −0.321⁎⁎⁎ −0.225⁎⁎⁎
(4.323) (2.760) (4.596) (2.954) (−2.722) (−1.499) (−33.483) (−22.444)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.112⁎⁎⁎ 0.079⁎⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎⁎
(3.702) (3.635) (−3.157) (−15.512)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.107⁎⁎⁎ −0.096⁎⁎⁎ −0.207⁎⁎⁎ −0.191⁎⁎⁎ 0.022 −0.002 0.050⁎⁎⁎ −0.007
(−3.405) (−2.997) (−3.812) (−3.491) (0.778) (−0.055) (3.169) (−0.436)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .04 .039 .019 .019 .043 .045 .079 .08
N left-censored 18,203 17,406 64,798 62,683
N right-censored 28,857 27,968 2295 2143
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each
country. Standardized beta coefﬁcients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
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world, regardless of whether the importing countries are developed
or not. To obtain a set of empirical results mapping the predictions
of a North–South trade model, we also focus on Chinese exports to
developed countries. We conduct regression analyses over groups of
countries at different levels of development (low-income countries,
high-income countries, and a few selected countries). The results
from OLS are reported in Table 7.38 Columns (1) through (6) show re-
sults for import-assembly, while those for pure-assembly are
reported in columns (7) to (12). Results are largely consistent with
those reported in Table 5 for the full sample of countries.
To address the concern that the US-based factor intensity mea-
sures may not reﬂect the intrinsic properties of production, and are
speciﬁc to the U.S., we focus on Chinese exports to the U.S. only in col-
umn (3). The results are quantitatively similar to those for the full
sample reported in Table 5, in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical
signiﬁcance. Columns (4) and (5) report consistent results using the
samples of exports to Japan and to high-income European countries,
respectively. In column (6) we exclude exports to Hong Kong from
the sample to address the concern that some foreign-owned plants
may have their headquarters in Hong Kong, who serve as intermedi-
aries to re-export ﬁnal products to foreign clients. The results are con-
sistent with those when the full sample of countries is used, in sign,
statistical signiﬁcance and magnitude.
In sum, the results reported in this section show that while for the
import-assembly regime the share of vertical integration is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with the intensity of inputs provided by
the headquarter, for the pure-assembly regime there is no evidence
of a positive relationship. These results are consistent with our theo-
retical Prediction 1, which predicts that if the beneﬁt to integrate is
signiﬁcantly larger for the headquarter when she does not control
any imported inputs (import-assembly) than when she does (pure-
assembly), the share of vertically-integrated exports under import-
assembly is increasing in the sector's headquarter intensity, whereas
that under pure-assembly is decreasing.38 Results are robust to using Tobit methods, and to including the measures of
equipment-capital and plant-capital separately in alternative to the overall measure
of physical capital. Results remain robust when we include R&D intensity as an alterna-
tive proxy for headquarter intensity.5.2. Examining the effects of productivity dispersion
This section investigates the effect of productivity dispersion, and
its interactive effects with headquarter intensity, on the prevalence of
integrated plants' exports across industries. It is now a well-known
fact that ﬁrm productivity differs widely within an industry, and ex-
hibits a ﬂat-tail distribution.39 Our model predicts that when the dis-
tribution of ﬁrm productivity becomes more dispersed (i.e., more
clustered on the right tail), the share of integrated plants' exports
under pure-assembly increases while the relationship is ambiguous
in the import-assembly regime.40
We follow Helpman et al. (2004) and use the standard deviation of
the log of ﬁrm sales across ﬁrms within an industry (σjθ) as the empir-
ical counterpart of productivity dispersion. We estimate the following
equation:
XlV
∑l¼N;S;k¼V ;OXlk
 !
pjc
¼ dc þ δθ þ δθηηj
 
 σθj þ γhΓ j þ pjc ð11Þ
where l is the regime type (import-assembly or pure assembly) and Γj
contains the headquarter intensity measures deﬁned above. ηj is one
of the measures of headquarter intensity (skill, capital or R&D). We
control for importer heterogeneity by including country ﬁxed effects,
dc. The model predicts that the most productive ﬁrms engage in inte-
gration under pure-assembly in headquarter-intensive sectors. Thus,
we expect δθ>0 and δθη>0 for the pure-assembly regime.
Using the product-country sample, we report the estimates of
Eq. (11) in Table 8. We include all stand-alone headquarter intensity
measures as controls, and cluster standard errors at the SIC 4-digit
level. Columns (1) to (3) report results for the pure-assembly regime.
The coefﬁcients on both the stand-alone productivity dispersion term
σjθ and productivity dispersion interacted with headquarter intensity
ηj×σjθ are positive and statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level, for all prox-
ies of headquarter inputs, ηj, used. This suggests that the export share
of integrated plants increases in productivity dispersion in sectors
with higher headquarter intensity. For import-assembly, we do not
ﬁnd evidence of a positive relationship between sectoral productivity39 According to Bernard et al. (2007) and Bernard et al. (2009), the top 1 (10) percent
of the U.S. trading ﬁrms accounted for 81 (96) percent of U.S. trade in 2000.
40 The ambiguity arises because both organization modes could lose market share
when the distribution of ﬁrm productivity is more dispersed.
Table 7
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (different country groups) (HS6 level).
Import-assembly Pure-assembly
Country group (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LIC HIC USA JAPAN EUROPE_HIC EXCLUDE
HK
LIC HIC USA JAPAN EUROPE_HIC EXCLUDE
HK
Skill intensity,
ln(H/L)
0.134⁎⁎⁎ 0.075⁎⁎ 0.071⁎⁎ 0.085⁎⁎⁎ 0.111⁎⁎⁎ 0.089⁎⁎ −0.060 −0.027 −0.028 −0.058 −0.055⁎ -0.028
(3.731) (2.511) (2.258) (2.614) (3.166) (2.410) (−1.419) (−0.682) (−0.883) (−1.291) (−1.790) (−0.664)
Capital intensity,
ln(K/L)
0.189⁎⁎⁎ 0.148⁎⁎⁎ 0.188⁎⁎⁎ 0.234⁎⁎⁎ 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.171⁎⁎⁎ −0.064 −0.148⁎⁎ −0.182⁎⁎⁎ −0.226⁎⁎⁎ −0.126⁎⁎⁎ −0.155⁎⁎
(3.779) (2.906) (4.410) (4.570) (3.064) (3.374) (−0.910) (−2.223) (−3.352) (−3.019) (−2.770) (−2.228)
Material intensity,
ln(M/L)
−0.130⁎⁎⁎ −0.119⁎⁎⁎ −0.169⁎⁎⁎ −0.106⁎⁎ −0.137⁎⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎⁎ 0.006 0.028 0.066 0.058 0.036 0.020
(−2.946) (−2.817) (−3.974) (−2.543) (−3.667) (−3.059) (0.136) (0.626) (1.632) (1.222) (0.979) (0.451)
N 1491 3585 2460 2721 2560 3525 1491 3585 2460 2721 2560 3525
No. clusters 282 346 321 331 323 347 282 346 321 331 323 347
No. countries 47 59 1 1 38 233 47 59 1 1 38 233
R2 .044 .022 .034 .044 .03 .029 .0071 .018 .024 .042 .015 .021
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. Country classiﬁcation by the World Bank according to GNI
per capita in 2007. LIC stands for Low income countries. HIC stands for High income countries. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country group. Standardized
beta coefﬁcients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎ pb0.10.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
Table 8
Productivity dispersion and the export share of vertically integrated plants (Chinese ﬁrms-sales-based dispersion measure) (HS6-country level).
Chinese ﬁrms-sales-based dispersion measure
Trade regime Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure Skill Capital R&D Skill Capital R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dispersion 0.133⁎⁎⁎ 0.337⁎⁎⁎ 0.241⁎⁎⁎ 0.206⁎⁎⁎ −0.374⁎⁎ −0.061
(3.433) (3.881) (2.598) (2.857) (−2.466) (−0.312)
Dispersion interaction 0.153⁎⁎⁎ 0.202⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.148 −0.275⁎⁎⁎ −0.038
(3.329) (4.062) (2.797) (1.470) (−3.292) (−0.864)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter intensity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 67,952 67,952 67,952 67,952 67,952 67,952
No. clusters 286 286 286 286 286 286
R2 .051 .057 .051 .047 .05 .046
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' Export Processing exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product
category to each country. Regular coefﬁcients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include
ln(H/L), ln(K/L), ln(RD/Q) and ln(M/L).
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
41 The approach of using sector measures constructed using U.S. data originates from
Rajan and Zingales (1998). Subsequent empirical studies on countries' comparative ad-
vantage have adopted the same approach. See Romalis (2003), Levchenko (2007),
Nunn (2007) and Manova (2007), among others.
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(6)). These results provide support for prediction 2.
For robustness checks, we also use exports-basedmeasures of pro-
ductivity dispersion, following Nunn and Treﬂer (2008). Results are
reported in Table 9. In columns (1) through (6), the measure of pro-
ductivity dispersion used is the standard deviation of the log of export
revenue of Chinese export processing plants in each sector in 2005.
The results are largely consistent with those from Table 8. All disper-
sion and interaction terms are positive and statistically signiﬁcant
for pure-assembly, while they are insigniﬁcant for import-assembly.
We obtain similar results when using the U.S. export-based measure
of productivity dispersion from Nunn and Treﬂer (2008), with the ex-
ception that when skill is used to proxy for ηj the coefﬁcients in column
(7) become insigniﬁcant. All the results in this section are robust to
using a sample at the HS 6-digit product level.
5.3. Robustness checks
In this section, we present robustness checks for the baseline re-
sults from Section 5.1. The factor intensity measures we usedpreviously are constructed using the U.S. data, which is based on
the assumption that the ranking of these measures is stable across
countries. Although this approach has been widely adopted in previ-
ous empirical studies,41 to check the robustness of our results we also
use factor intensity and R&D intensity measures constructed using
the Chinese ﬁrm-level data. The Chinese measures are described in
Section 4. Table 10 reports results at the HS6-country level. We obtain
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between skill inten-
sity, R&D and advertisement intensity, and the share of integrated
plants' exports under import-assembly (columns (1) through (5)).
The results are independent of using samples at the product or
country-product level.
The coefﬁcient on capital intensity is statistically insigniﬁcant. As
discussed above, the overall physical capital measure includes
Table 9
Productivity dispersion and the export share of vertically integrated plants (export-based dispersion measure) (HS6-country level).
Chinese ﬁrms-export-based dispersion measure US ﬁrms-export-based dispersion measure
Trade regime Pure-assembly Import-assembly Pure-assembly Import-assembly
Headquarter intensity measure Skill Capital R&D Skill Capital R&D Skill Capital R&D Skill Capital R&D
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dispersion 0.032⁎ 0.077⁎⁎⁎ 0.066⁎⁎⁎ 0.050 0.077 0.070 0.074 0.188⁎⁎⁎ 0.130⁎⁎ 0.090 −0.262⁎⁎⁎ −0.032
(1.691) (3.970) (2.597) (1.079) (1.421) (1.271) (1.543) (3.686) (2.398) (1.164) (−3.497) (−0.326)
Dispersion interaction 0.037⁎ 0.045⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.074 −0.023 −0.011 0.060 0.094⁎⁎⁎ 0.026⁎⁎ 0.054 −0.165⁎⁎⁎ −0.016
(1.932) (4.006) (2.674) (−1.559) (−0.784) (−0.941) (1.236) (3.700) (2.249) (0.685) (−4.475) (−0.811)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Headquarter intensity controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 76,611 76,611 76,611 76,611 76,611 76,611 77,111 77,111 77,111 77,111 77,111 77,111
No. clusters 310 310 310 310 310 310 316 316 316 316 316 316
R2 .046 .049 .048 .064 .063 .063 .046 .052 .048 .045 .05 .045
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' Export Processing exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product
category to each country. Regular coefﬁcients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. Headquarter intensity controls include
ln(H/L), ln(K/L), ln(RD/Q) and ln(M/L).
⁎ pb0.10.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
Table 10
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (using Chinese data to measure factor intensities) (HS6-country level).
Trade regime Import-assembly Pure-assembly
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Skill Int. 0.172⁎⁎⁎ 0.185⁎⁎⁎ −0.155⁎⁎⁎ −0.135⁎⁎⁎
(6.961) (7.691) (−5.915) (−5.171)
R&D+Adv. Int. 0.127⁎⁎⁎ 0.127⁎⁎⁎ −0.078⁎⁎⁎ −0.078⁎⁎⁎
(5.143) (5.139) (−2.861) (−2.910)
Capital Int. 0.016 −0.040 0.045 −0.106⁎⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎ −0.127⁎⁎⁎
(0.467) (−1.460) (1.309) (−3.112) (−1.995) (−3.840)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 80,528 71,116 80,528 80,528 71,116 80,528 71,116 80,528 80,528 71,116
No. clusters 351 314 351 351 314 351 314 351 351 314
R2 .041 .029 .012 .043 .031 .052 .035 .04 .056 .051
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each
country. Skill intensity is measured by the average share of high-school workers in the labor force of each sector, averaged across ﬁrms. Capital intensity is measured by the average
ratio of real value of capital to real output across ﬁrms. RD+Advert intensity is measured by the log ratio of the sum of R& D and advertisement expenditure to value-added. Stan-
dardized beta coefﬁcients are reported. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
42 We also performed similar exercises dropping the lowest 10%, 20% or 40% of HS6
sectors by export value, and obtained quantitatively similar results in sign, magnitude
and statistical signiﬁcance.
43 Results are robust to using Tobit methods.
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the integration decision. However, the Chinese data limit us from
constructing measures of contractible and non-contractible invest-
ments in capital separately in the regressions. For pure-assembly,
we ﬁnd evidence of a negative relationship between the measures
of headquarter intensity and the share of vertically integrated exports
(columns (6) through (10)). These ﬁndings are largely consistent
with the results obtained when we use the US-based measures of fac-
tor intensity.
The vertically-integrated export shares are bounded between the
values zero and one. Table A1 shows that there are a number of obser-
vations that cluster around the two endpoints. It is expected that in
thinner markers there will be more clustering around zero and one.
For example, in the extreme situation where there is only one ﬁrm
in a HS 6-digit category, the ﬁrm will either vertically integrate with
the plant or offshore. To take this into account, as a further robustness
check we limit the estimation sample to larger HS6 sectors which are
more likely to be populated by a large number of ﬁrms with different
productivity levels that chose different production modes. We esti-
mate Eq. (10) including only large HS6 categories by dropping thebottom 3 deciles in terms of export volume.42 Table 11 reports the re-
gression results. We continue to ﬁnd that the share of vertical inte-
grated exports is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with all
measures of headquarters intensity of inputs for import-assembly.
The coefﬁcients are also of similar magnitude to those reported in
Table 6. The results are robust to using observations at the product
or product-country level. For pure-assembly, we ﬁnd no evidence of
a positive correlation between headquarter intensity and vertical
integration.
As a further robustness check, instead of running separate regres-
sions for the import-assembly and pure-assembly regimes we pool
the data across the two regimes and run a regression on the full sam-
ple including dummies for import-assembly. Results from OLS are
reported in Table 12.43 Columns (1) through (4) report results at
the HS6 level while columns (5) through (8) report those for the
Table 11
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (HS6-country level) (large HS6 sample).
Trade regime Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.100⁎⁎⁎ 0.282⁎⁎⁎ −0.012 0.080⁎⁎⁎
(3.716) (3.555) (−0.434) (4.058)
Capital intensity, ln(K/L) 0.153⁎⁎⁎ 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.239⁎⁎⁎ 0.168⁎⁎⁎ −0.131⁎⁎⁎ −0.081 −0.316⁎⁎⁎ −0.221⁎⁎⁎
(4.387) (2.854) (4.649) (3.053) (−2.825) (−1.580) (−34.104) (−22.694)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.110⁎⁎⁎ 0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎⁎
(3.591) (3.516) (−3.076) (−14.882)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.110⁎⁎⁎ −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.210⁎⁎⁎ −0.194⁎⁎⁎ 0.023 −0.001 0.051⁎⁎⁎ −0.004
(−3.440) (−3.047) (−3.850) (−3.541) (0.824) (−0.018) (3.369) (−0.288)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 77,814 74,617 77,814 74,617 77,814 74,617 77,814 74,617
No. clusters 340 310 340 310 340 310 340 310
R2 .041 .04 .02 .019 .042 .044 .082 .082
N left-censored 17,197 16,442 62,514 60,468
N right-censored 27,570 26,719 2086 1947
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. The estimation sample for this table is restricted to the
largest HS6 categories in export value, by dropping the bottom 3 deciles. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each country. Standardized beta coefﬁcients are reported
for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.
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as well as interaction terms between the headquarter intensity prox-
ies and a dummy variable which takes the value of one for theTable 12
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants, pooled across re
Trade regime HS6
(1) (2) (3) (4
D∗Skill intensity 0.101⁎⁎ 0.192⁎⁎⁎
(2.100) (4.415)
D∗Capital intensity 0.128⁎⁎⁎ 0.085⁎
(2.637) (1.734)
D∗R&D intensity 0.052⁎⁎⁎ 0.0
(3.881) (5
D∗Equipment intensity 0.216⁎⁎⁎ 0.1
(4.090) (2
D∗Plant Intensity −0.220⁎⁎⁎ −
(−5.043) (−
D∗Material intensity −0.072⁎⁎ −0.046 −0.016 0.0
(−1.981) (−1.312) (−0.489) (0
Skill intensity −0.014 −0.050⁎⁎
(−0.542) (−2.315)
Capital intensity −0.045⁎⁎ −0.023
(−1.970) (−1.043)
R&D intensity −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −
(−3.500) (−
Equipment intensity −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −
(−3.413) (−
Plant intensity 0.066⁎⁎⁎ 0.0
(2.974) (2
Material intensity 0.003 −0.013 −0.005 −
(0.205) (−0.857) (−0.339) (−
Country ﬁxed effects No No No No
N 7328 7082 7328 70
No. clusters 349 318 349 31
R2 .39 .4 .4 .41
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of tot
(1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product category to each country in columns (5) to (8). The estim
import-assembly regime. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in
⁎ pb0.10.
⁎⁎ pb0.05.
⁎⁎⁎ pb0.01.import-assembly regime. The table reports regular, unstandardized
coefﬁcients, for direct comparison with those that result from run-
ning separate regressions for each regime.gimes, dummy for import-assembly.
HS6-country
) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.153⁎⁎⁎ 0.249⁎⁎⁎
(3.329) (5.964)
0.158⁎⁎⁎ 0.103⁎⁎
(3.917) (2.353)
61⁎⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎
.040) (3.913) (5.202)
45⁎⁎⁎ 0.228⁎⁎⁎ 0.136⁎⁎⁎
.838) (5.787) (3.324)
0.203⁎⁎⁎ −0.220⁎⁎⁎ −0.182⁎⁎⁎
4.753) (−6.066) (−5.198)
18 −0.099⁎⁎⁎ −0.080⁎⁎ −0.045 −0.020
.562) (−2.887) (−2.296) (−1.446) (−0.642)
−0.016 −0.045⁎⁎
(−0.817) (−2.496)
−0.048⁎⁎⁎ −0.029
(−2.688) (−1.450)
0.022⁎⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎⁎
3.958) (−3.168) (−4.267)
0.060⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.048⁎⁎
2.420) (−4.062) (−2.552)
59⁎⁎⁎ 0.063⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎
.738) (4.675) (4.175)
0.017 0.010 0.000 −0.004 −0.011
1.166) (0.820) (0.004) (−0.325) (−1.029)
Yes Yes Yes Yes
82 160,948 154,362 160,948 154,362
8 349 318 349 318
.39 .4 .4 .41
al Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category in columns
ation sample includes observations in both regimes, and D is a dummy variable for the
parentheses.
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sures correspond to those for the pure-assembly regime.44 They re-
main statistically insigniﬁcant or negative and signiﬁcant. The
coefﬁcients on the interaction between headquarter intensity and
the dummy for import-assembly correspond to the difference in the
headquarter intensity coefﬁcients between the two regimes. The re-
sults show that the difference is positive and statistically signiﬁcant
for all proxies of headquarter intensity. We therefore conﬁrm the
ﬁnding of a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the share of
vertically integrated exports and all measures of headquarter intensi-
ty for the import-assembly regime but not for pure-assembly. Results
show that the coefﬁcients are statistically different between the two
regimes. In sum, the results reported in this section conﬁrm the ﬁnd-
ings from the baseline speciﬁcations reported in the previous
sections.
6. Conclusions
This paper uses detailed product-level export data for China to in-
vestigate the determinants of foreign integration versus outsourcing.
We exploit the coexistence of two regulatory trade regimes for export
processing in China, pure-assembly and import-assembly, which let
us observe the allocation of ownership and control rights over impo-
rted components in a multinational production relationship. Under
import-assembly, Chinese plants make the decision of which compo-
nents to purchase and have control rights over their use. Under pure-
assembly, ownership and control over the components shipped to
China remains with the ﬁnal-good producer. To examine how choices
of organizational structure are affected by the allocation of control
rights over the imported inputs in export processing, we present an
extension of the Antràs and Helpman (2004) model to consider in-
vestments in input purchasing.
By considering two ownership structures under two trade re-
gimes, our model predicts that if the beneﬁt to integrate is signiﬁcant-
ly larger for the headquarter when she does not control any imported
inputs (import-assembly) than when she does (pure-assembly), the
share of vertically-integrated exports under import-assembly is in-
creasing in the sector's headquarter intensity, consistent with
the main prediction in Antràs (2003); whereas that under pure-
assembly is decreasing. In a headquarter-intensive sector where
safeguarding the headquarter's investment incentives is important,
a foreign client can choose to either own and control imported inputs
or own only the plant's assets to alleviate hold-up. The export volume
from integrated plants increases for both import-assembly and pure-
assembly. If the export volume increases more for the former, the
share of integrated plants under pure-assembly in total processing
trade decreases.
Our empirical results show that when the control rights over the
input-purchase decisions are allocated to the Chinese assembly
plant, the export share of integrated plants is increasing in the inten-
sity of headquarter inputs across sectors. These results are consistent
with the existing research on intra-ﬁrm trade. However, if Chinese
plants engage in pure-assembly (i.e., the foreign ﬁrm has ownership
and control over the components shipped to China), we ﬁnd no evi-
dence of a positive correlation between the prevalence of vertical in-
tegration and the intensity of headquarter inputs, consistent with our
model predictions. These results imply that control over components
for assembly can be used as an alternative to asset ownership to mit-
igate hold-up by foreign suppliers when offshoring assembly tasks.44 Note that in Table 12 we report regular coefﬁcients while in Tables 5 and 6 we re-
port standardized beta coefﬁcients. The coefﬁcients on the stand alone headquarter in-
tensity measures reported in Table 12 are identical to the unstandardized coefﬁcients
corresponding to the results from Tables 5 and 6, for the pure-assembly regime. The
unstandardized coefﬁcients from the separate regression for import-assembly are
identical to the sum of the coefﬁcients on the stand-alone headquarter measures and
the interaction terms reported in Table 12.Consistent with the theoretical prediction about the sorting of ﬁrms
into different production modes, we ﬁnd that the export share of inte-
grated plants in pure-assembly increases in productivity dispersion in
sectors with higher headquarter intensity. For import-assembly, we
do not ﬁnd evidence of a positive relationship between sectoral produc-
tivity dispersion and the share of integrated plants' exports.
Appendix A
A.1. Derivation of the model
Pure-assembly (the N mode). Recall from the main text that under
pure-assembly (the N mode), the ex-post revenue-sharing rules
imply βNV=δα+β(1−δα)>βNO=β. In this regime, H maximizes
her expected operating proﬁts anticipating ex post payoffs as follows:
max
m;h
βNkR m; a;hð Þ−wNλNm−wNhf g:
A's maximization problem is
max
a
1−βNkð ÞR m; a;hð Þ−wSaf g:
For organizational form k∈{V,O}, solving H's and A's problems si-
multaneously gives the proﬁt-maximizing levels a⁎, h⁎ and m⁎ in
terms of wS, wS, λ, θ, D, η's and importantly, βNk.45 Plugging a⁎, h⁎,
and m⁎ into the production unit's revenue function (Eq. (3)), we
solve for ﬁrm revenue associated with organization mode k under
pure-assembly as RNk=DΘφNk, where Θ≡θ
α
1−α and
φNk ¼
λNð Þη
m
α
wS
1−βNk
 ηa wN
βNk
 ηhþηm" #− α1−α
;
and the operating proﬁt becomes πNk=DΘψNk−wNfNk,, where fNk is
the ﬁxed cost of production and
ψNk ¼ φNk 1−α βNkηm þ βNkηh þ 1−βNkð Þηa
h in o
:
The function ψNk reaches its maximum when
dψNk
dβNk
¼ 0. Solving this
equation yields
βN η
a  ¼ 1−αηa
 
1−ηa
 
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ηa 1−αηað Þ 1−ηað Þ 1−α 1−ηað Þð Þp
1−2ηa :
Notice βN* ′(ηa)b0. Given that ηa=1−(ηh+ηm), βN* ′(ηh+ηm)>0.
These comparative statics will ultimately determine the optimal pro-
duction mode.
A.1.1. Import-assembly
Recall from the main text that under import-assembly (the
S mode), the ex-post revenue-sharing rules imply βSV=β(1−γ)+
(1−β)δα>βSO=β(1−γ). Notice that βNV>βSV>βSO. If we further
assume that asset ownership is sufﬁciently more effective in alleviat-
ing the hold-up by A, that is, δα(1−β)>γ, we have βSV=β(1−γ)+
(1−β)δα>β=βNO.
Anticipating ex-post bargaining as investments are non-contractible,
Hmaximizes her expected operating proﬁts as:
max
h
βSkR m; a; hð Þ−wNhf g:45 λm ¼ ηm βNk1−βNk
 αηa wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λNð Þηm α
αβNkD
1−αθα
" # 1
α−1
;wSa ¼ ηa 1−βNkð ÞβNk
βNk
1−βNk
 αηa wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λNð Þηm α
αβNkD
1−αθα
" # 1
α−1
;
wNh ¼ ηh βNk1−βNk
 αηa wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λNð Þηm α
αβNkD
1−αθα
" # 1
α−1
.
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max
a;m
1−βSkð ÞR m; a; hð Þ−wSλSm−wSaf g
For organizational form k∈ {V,O}, solving H's and A's problems si-
multaneously gives the proﬁt-maximizing investment levels a⁎, h⁎
andm⁎ in terms of wS, wN, λ, θ, D, η's and importantly, βSk.46 Plugging
a⁎, h⁎ and m⁎ into the joint production unit's revenue (Eq. (3)),
we obtain revenue for organization mode k under pure-assembly as
RNk=DΘφSk, where Θ≡θ
α
1−α and
φSk ¼
λSð Þη
m
α
wS
1−βSk
 1−ηh wN
βSk
 ηh" #− α1−α
:
The joint production unit's operating proﬁt (which is H's objective
when choosing the optimal production mode as we will see below)
can be expressed as πSk=ψSkDΘ−wNfSk, where Θ≡θ
α
1−α and
ψSk ¼ φSk 1−α βSkηh þ 1−βSkð Þ 1−ηh
 h in o
:
The function ψSk reaches its maximum when
dψSk
dβSk
¼ 0, implying
βS η
h
 
¼
ηh 1−α 1−ηh
  
−
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ηh 1−ηh
 
1−αηh
 
1−α 1−ηh
  q
2ηh−1
:
Notice that βS* ′(ηh)>0, which is an essential property for deter-
mining the ex ante optimal production mode.
A.1.2. Choosing Optimal Production Modes
The coexistence of all four production modes, as illustrated in
Fig. 1, requires a speciﬁc ranking of ψ′lks. The ranking of ψ′lks ultimate-
ly depends on β′Sks and the input prices: wN, wS, λN, and λS. On the
one hand, for a given organizational mode (k), giving H's control
over imported components under pure assembly gives her more in-
centives to invest in headquarter activities compared with import-
assembly (i.e., ψSkbψNk). On the other hand, lowerwS canmake A's pro-
curement of components and thus import-assembly more attractive
than pure-assembly for H. Formally, for a given component intensity
ηm, outsourcing under pure-assembly would be more proﬁtable than
integration under import-assembly (i.e., ψNO>ψSV) if and only if
λN
λS
 ηm
≤
ν βNO; η
h
 
ζ βSV ;η
h
  ; ð12Þ
where ν ξ; ηh
 
¼ 1−α ξηh þ ξηm þ 1−ξð Þ 1−ηh−ηm
  h i1−α
α ξη
hþηm
1−ξð Þ1−ηh−ηm and ζ ξ; ηh
 
¼ 1−α ξηh þ 1−ξð Þ 1−ηh
  h i1−α
α
1−ξð Þ1−ηhξηh .47 The higher the marginal costs of component search in
the North relative to the South, the more likely inequality (12) will
hold.48 As such, we have the following ranking of proﬁtability (the
slopes of πlk):
ψNV > ψNO > ψSV > ψSO:46 λm ¼ ηm βSk1−βSk
 1−αηh wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λSð Þηm α
αβSkD
1−αθ
α
" # 1
α−1
;wSa ¼ ηa βSk1−βSk
 1−αηh wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λSð Þηm α
αβSkD
1−αθ
α
2
4
3
5
1
α−1
;
wNh ¼ ηh βSk1−βSk
 
βSk
1−βSk
 1−αηh wSð Þηa wNð Þηh λSð Þηm α
αβSkD
1−αθ
α
2
4
3
5
1
α−1
.
47 We obtain this inequality by rearranging ψNO(βNO,ηa,ηh)>ψSV(βSV,ηa,ηh).
48 Notice that both ν and ζ are non-monotonic in ξ for low value of ηh. In particular, in
an assembly-intensive sector (i.e., when ηh is small), ζ cuts ν from above at ξ>1/2, af-
ter which both ζ and ν are decreasing in ξ.Proof of lemma. For organization mode k,
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ≥0.
Proof. Notice that
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ¼ α1−α ln
1−βSk
1−βNk
βNk
βSk
 
þ α 2βSk−1ð Þ
ΩSk ηa ;ηhð Þ −
α 2βNk−1ð Þ
ΩNk ηa;ηhð Þ
 	
where ΩSk(ηa,ηh)=1−α[βSkηh+(1−βSk)(1−ηh)] and ΩNk(ηa,ηh)=
1−α[βNk(ηm+ηh)+(1−βNk)(1−ηh−ηm)].49
Consider ηh=1 (i.e., ηa=ηm=0) for the moment.
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ¼
α
1−α ln
1−βSk
1−βNk
βNk
βSk
 
þ α 2βSk−1ð Þ1−αβSk −
α 2βNk−1ð Þ
1−αβNk
h i
. Notice that ddγ
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ¼
β α1−α
1
1−βSkð ÞβSk
 
− α 2−αð Þ
1−αβSkð Þ2
h i
. Given that 1−βSkð Þ 1−αð ÞβSkb 1−αβSkð Þ2,
we know that ddγ
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh > 0. Since when γ=0, ψNk=ψSk and
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ¼
0 for k={O,V}, we can show that
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh > 0∀γ∈ 0;1½ .
Let us know consider ηhb1. Notice that
dΩSk ηa ;ηhð Þ
dηh ¼−α 2βSk−1ð Þ >
dΩNk ηa ;ηhð Þ
dηh ¼ −α 2βNk−1ð Þ, together with βNk>βSk, we can show that
d2 ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηhð Þ2 b0. Since
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh > 0 when η
h=1,
d ln
ψNk
ψSk
 
dηh ≥0 ∀η
h∈ 0;1½ . ■
Similarly, we can show that
d ln
ψlV
ψlO
 
dηh ≥0 for trade regime l; and since
we assume that asset ownership is more effective in alleviating hold-
up compared to input control (i.e., βSV>βNO), we can show that
d ln
ψNO
ψSV
 
dηh ≤0.
The export share of integrated import-assembly processing plants
in total processing exports is
sSV ¼
XSV
∑l¼V ;O;k¼N;S Xlk
¼ XSO
XSV
þ XNO
XSV
þ XNV
XSV
þ 1
 	−1
;
where XSOXSV ¼
φSO
φSV
ΘSV
ΘSO
 κ−1−1 	 1− ΘSVΘNO
 κ−1 	−1
; XNOXSV ¼
φNO
φSV
1− ΘNOΘNV
 κ−1 	
ΘNO
ΘSV
 κ−1−1 	−1; and XNVXSV ¼ φNVφSV ΘNVΘSV
 κ−1− ΘNVΘNO
 κ−1 	−1
. Simple com-
parative statics show that both XSOXSV and
XNO
XSV
are decreasing in ηh. The im-
pact of an increase of ηh on XNVXSV is ambiguous since
φNV
φSV
is increasing in
ηh, but ΘNVΘNO is increasing in η
h whereas ΘNVΘSV can be increasing or decreas-
ing in ηh. As such, the relation between ηh and XSV∑l¼V ;O;k¼N;SXlk is ambigu-
ous. See Fig. 2 for a graphical exposition.
The export share of integrated pure-assembly plants in total pro-
cessing exports is
sNV ¼
XNV
∑l¼V ;O;k¼N;SXlk
¼ XSO
XNV
þ XNO
XNV
þ XSV
XNV
þ 1
 	−1
;
where XSOXNV ¼
φSO
φNV
ΘNV
ΘSO
 κ−1
1− ΘSOΘSV
 κ−1 	
; XNOXNV ¼
φNO
φNV
ΘNV
ΘNO
 κ−1−1 	; and
XSV
XNV
¼ φSVφNV
ΘNV
ΘSV
 κ−1− ΘNVΘNO
 κ−1 	
. Simple comparative statics show that
both XSOXNV and
XNO
XNV
are decreasing in ηh. As is discussed above, the impact
of an increase of ηh on XNVXSV is ambiguous, implying that the relation be-
tween ηh and XNV∑l¼V ;O;k¼N;SXlk is also ambiguous.49 ΩSk 0ð Þ
ΩNk 0ð Þ ¼
1−α 1−βSkð Þ
1−α βNk− 2βNk−1ð Þηa½  and
ΩSk 1ð Þ
ΩNk 1ð Þ ¼
1−αβSk
1−αβNk . While the value of
ΩSk 0ð Þ
ΩNk 0ð Þ depends on
the value of ηa, ΩSk 1ð ÞΩNk 1ð Þ > 1 >
2βSk−1
2βNk−1.
Table A2
Summary statistics of headquarter intensity measures (across SIC 4-digit categories).
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean # of SIC
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) −1.330 −1.165 −0.973 −0.757 −0.557 −0.966 451
Capital intensity, ln(K/L) −2.655 −2.272 −1.922 −1.458 −0.978 −1.862 451
R&D intensity, ln (RD/Q) −6.269 −5.331 −4.474 −3.677 −3.012 −4.585 414
Material intensity, ln (M/L) 0.378 0.665 1.025 1.423 1.904 1.092 451
Equipment intensity, ln (E/L) −0.374 −0.015 0.425 0.910 1.465 0.487 451
Structure intensity, ln(P/L) −0.717 −0.471 −0.128 0.339 0.789 −0.034 451
ln(high-sch emp/emp), Chinese plants, ln(H/E) −1.179 −1.031 −0.797 −0.618 −0.418 −0.811 513
ln(college em/emp), Chinese plants, ln(C/E) −3.069 −2.669 −2.273 −1.819 −1.437 −2.250 513
ln(real value K/real Y), Chinese plants, ln(K/Y) −1.336 −1.082 −0.814 −0.563 −0.086 −0.768 513
ln(R&D+Advert. Intensity), Chinese Plants, ln(RD/V) −7.051 −6.575 −5.949 −5.246 −4.493 −5.857 458
Table A3
Correlations between headquarter intensity measures (across SIC 4-digit).
ln(H/L) ln(K/L) ln(RD/Q) ln(M/L) ln(E/L) ln(P/L) ln(H/E) ln(C/E) ln(K/Y) ln(RD/V)
ln(H/L) 1.000
ln(K/L) −0.141 1.000
ln (RD/Q) 0.475 0.051 1.000
ln(M/L) −0.232 0.628 −0.196 1.000
ln(E/L) −0.257 0.774 −0.003 0.545 1.000
ln(P/L) −0.068 0.585 0.041 0.530 0.782 1.000
ln(H/E) 0.429 0.258 0.429 0.120 0.186 0.177 1.000
ln(C/E) 0.474 0.209 0.443 0.072 0.111 0.108 0.968 1.000
ln(K/Y) −0.065 0.256 0.099 −0.058 0.289 0.247 0.308 0.280 1.000
ln(RD/V) 0.413 0.024 0.425 −0.067 −0.116 0.002 0.519 0.562 0.084 1.000
Table A1
Summary statistics of the export share of vertically integrated plants across HS6 categories.
Trade regime 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th mean #Obs.
Import-and-assembly 0 0.197 0.615 0.900 1 0.552 3825
Pure-assembly 0 0 0.002 0.091 0.365 0.106 3825
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ports (sSV+sNV) is increasing in ηh since XSOXSV ,
XNO
XSV
, XSOXNV , and
XNO
XNV
are all de-
creasing in ηh. This result implies that either sSV, sNV, or both need to
be increasing in ηh. Of note, the ratio XSVXNV , which appears in both (7)
and (8), plays a key role in determining the relation between ηh,
sNV, and sSV. Speciﬁcally, if
d
XSV
XNV
 
dηh >−
d
XSO
XNV
þXNOXNV
 
dηh > 0,
dsSV
dηh > 0 but
dsNV
dηh b0.
50 Recall that XSVXNV ¼
φSV
φNV
ΘNV
ΘSV
 κ−1
− ΘNVΘNO
 κ−1 	
. Fig. 2 shows
that the productivity cutoffs ΘNV and ΘSV are both decreasing in ηh.
Figuratively, a sufﬁciently high
d
XSV
XNV
 
dηh requires ΘNV declines sufﬁcient-
ly less than ΘSV (i.e.,
d
ΘNV
ΘSV
 
dηh is sufﬁciently positive). Formally, a sufﬁ-
ciently high
dln
ΘNV
ΘSV
dηh require that
d ψSVψSO
 
dηh
>>
ψSV
ψSO
−1
 
ψNV
ψNO
−1
 d ψNVψNO
 
dηh
þ ψSV
ψNO
− ψSO
ψNO
 d ψNOψSO
 
dηh
> 0: ð13Þ
If inequality (13) holds with a wide margin, the integrated export
share under import-assembly would increase with ηh, whereas that
under pure-assembly would decrease. The required inequality is
more likely to satisfy if integration is associated with a substantially50 Notice that
d
XSV
XNV
 
dηh > 0 implies that
d
XNV
XSV
 
dηh b0 and thus sSV is increasing in η
h
unambiguously.smaller increase in proﬁtability with controls over inputs rather
than without (i.e., a high
d
ψSV
ψSO
 
dηh ). Consistently, if ψSV/ψSO to 1, com-
pared to ψNV/ψNO (i.e., integration does not buy H that much beneﬁt
if inputs are controlled by A), the required inequality is also more
likely to hold. These results are summarized in Prediction 1.
Proof of Prediction 2. Let us denote the variance of Θ by
V ¼ κΘ2min κ−1ð Þ−2 κ−2ð Þ−1. It can be shown that dVdκ b0.
Using (8), and that ΘNVΘSO >
ΘNV
ΘSV
> ΘNVΘNO > 1 and
ΘSV
ΘSO
> 1, it can be shown
that dsNVdκ b0 (i.e., sNV is increasing with the variance of Θ).
Using (7), the sign of dsSVdκ is generally indeterminate.A.2. Data Appendix
The concordance ﬁle for mapping SIC87 (4-digit) codes to HS-6
digit codes is taken from Peter Schott's website. We use the new con-
cordance of 1989-2008 US HS codes to US SIC, SITC and NAICS codes
over time, based on exports.51 When more than one SIC code is iden-
tiﬁed for a HS6 code (it happens for 371 HS6 codes out of 5203 in
manufacturing industries), the SIC code that covers the most HS8 cat-
egories within the HS6 code is used. For some cases, a HS6 code has
multiple SIC codes tied in the number of HS8 categories shared
(it happens for 208 cases). In those situations, we choose the SIC cat-
egory that has the highest number of HS6 categories under it as the
unique map (Tables A2, A3).51 http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/pks4/sub_international.htm.
Table A4
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants.
HS6-country HS6
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.123*** 0.345*** 0.091*** 0.108***
(4.585) (4.266) (2.830) (2.753)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.062** 0.020**
(3.335) (3.109) (2.244) (2.113)
Equipment Intensity, ln(E/L) 0.139*** 0.063** 0.224*** 0.123*** 0.105** 0.052 0.065** 0.035
(4.471) (1.992) (5.331) (2.762) (2.028) (0.969) (2.193) (1.073)
Plant intensity, ln(P/L) −0.124*** −0.099*** −0.206*** −0.166*** −0.152*** −0.146** −0.097** −0.094**
(−3.587) (−2.829) (−3.464) (−2.775) (−2.680) (−2.543) (−2.428) (−2.288)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.066** −0.053 −0.151*** −0.129** −0.044 −0.029 −0.027 −0.017
(−2.221) (−1.625) (−2.813) (−2.196) (−1.072) (−0.707) (−0.941) (−0.573)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No
N 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 3664 3541 3664 3541
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .038 .033 .018 .016 .021 .02 .01 .0091
N left-censored 14,899 14,358 319 314
N right-censored 33,454 32,285 570 560
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' Export Processing exports as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each
country in columns (1) to (4) and a 6-digit HS product category in columns (5) to (8). Standardized beta coefﬁcients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors
clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. ** pb0.05, *** pb0.01.
Table A5
Headquarter intensity and the export share of vertically integrated plants (HS6-country level).
Trade regime Import-assembly Pure-assembly
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Skill intensity, ln(H/L) 0.151*** 0.428*** −0.064** −0.137***
(6.068) (5.894) (−2.437) (−6.931)
R&D intensity, ln(RD/Q) 0.134*** 0.095*** −0.100*** −0.079***
(4.777) (4.579) (−4.251) (−19.767)
Equipment intensity, ln(E/L) 0.242*** 0.135*** 0.331*** 0.188*** −0.214*** −0.149*** −0.444*** −0.355***
(6.177) (3.457) (6.703) (3.590) (−4.103) (−2.633) (−24.316) (−19.532)
Plant intensity, ln(P/L) −0.198*** −0.162*** −0.314*** −0.257*** 0.155*** 0.134*** 0.361*** 0.333***
(−5.512) (−4.580) (−5.258) (−4.321) (4.649) (4.187) (31.045) (27.242)
Material intensity, ln(M/L) −0.059** −0.038 −0.128** −0.092 −0.008 −0.027 −0.016 −0.053***
(−1.975) (−1.209) (−2.377) (−1.641) (−0.307) (−1.009) (−0.905) (−2.922)
Country ﬁxed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181 80,474 77,181
No. clusters 349 318 349 318 349 318 349 318
R2 .049 .046 .022 .021 .049 .052 .088 .091
N left-censored 18,203 17,406 64,798 62,683
N right-censored 28,857 27,968 2295 2143
Dependent variable: China's foreign-afﬁliated plants' exports in each regime as a share of total Export Processing exports. An observation is a 6-digit HS product category to each
country. Standardized beta coefﬁcients are reported for OLS results. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the SIC4 level are in parentheses. *pb0.10, ** pb0.05, *** pb0.01.
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